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PRESERVING THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE
Katrice Bridges Copeland*

I. INTRODUCTION

The logic is undeniable-if a corporation is willing to own up to its
wrongful conduct by cooperating with the government's criminal
investigation, the government may reward the corporation with more
lenient treatment.
But, the devil is in the details of defining
"cooperation."
For many years, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
defined cooperation to include waiver of the attorney-client privilege
and work product doctrine as well as terminating payment of legal fees
for targeted employees.' Thus, the DOJ threatened corporations with
indictment if they did not cooperate with the criminal investigation by
turning over the results of their attorney-conducted internal
investigations, such as witness interview memoranda, factual
summaries, and reports. Overuse of this tactic led to what many have
called a "culture of waiver,"2 where the DOJ forced corporations to
waive the attorney-client privilege and give the DOJ the evidence to
convict their employees to save the corporation from indictment. The
DOJ came under immense pressure from interest groups and Congress to
amend its policy and show more respect for the corporate attorney-client
privilege. 3 Ultimately, the DOJ changed its policy twice to thwart
* Assistant Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, The Dickinson School of Law;
B.S. 1998, The University of Illinois; J.D. 2001, The University of Michigan Law School. For helpful
comments on this project, I thank Kit Kinports, Victor Romero, the participants at the Big 10 Aspiring
Scholars Conference, the participants at the Northeast People of Color Conference, and the participants
at the Law and Society Conference. I am grateful to Dominic Rupprecht, Megan Marlow, Edward Kim,
and April Scherer of The Dickinson School of Law Class of 2010, for research assistance.
1. Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components
& U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) [hereinafter Thompson Memorandum], available at
http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate__guidelines.htm.
2. See American College of Trial Lawyers, Recommended Practicesfor Companies and Their
Counsel in Conducting Internal Investigations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 79 (2009) (describing the
Department of Justice following the enactment of their corporate charging policy as having a "culture of
waiver"); Peter Spivack & Sujit Raman, Regulating the 'New Regulators': Current Trends in Deferred
ProsecutionAgreements, 45 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 159, 169 (2008) (commenting on the "corrosive culture
of waiver" at the Department of Justice).
3. See, e.g., Jason McLure, The Life and Death of the Thompson Memorandum, LEGAL TIMES,
Dec. 18, 2006, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/WCnews065 (describing the
lobbying efforts of an "oddball alliance" of members of Congress, former Justice Department officials,

1199

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNA TI LAW REVIEW

1200

[Vol.78

passage of legislation introduced to protect the attorney-client
The DOJ's current policy prohibits prosecutors from
privilege. 4
considering the privileged status of documents in assessing
cooperation. 5 Under the new policy, the cooperation question is
whether the corporation has provided the DOJ all of the facts, not
whether the corporation waived the attorney-client privilege.
The DOJ's changes have not, however, alleviated all concerns about
the vulnerability of the corporate attorney-client privilege. To address
these concerns, U.S. Senator Arlen Specter reintroduced his AttorneyClient Privilege Protection Act in 2009 (ACPPA or the Act).6 The
ACPPA purports to save the corporate attorney-client privilege by
prohibiting government attorneys from basing a charging decision on a
corporation's refusal to hand over attorney-client privileged
documents,7 but the Act does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Thus, it leaves corporations in the same position they would be without
the legislation.
This Article argues that, while legislation such as the ACPPA is
necessary to preserve the corporate attorney-client privilege, any such
legislation must include judicial oversight to deter prosecutorial
misconduct effectively. Part II examines the costs and benefits of
granting corporations the attorney-client privilege in criminal
investigations. It concludes that the benefits of the privilege far
outweigh the costs and that the privilege must be safeguarded from
unnecessary infringement. Part III traces the evolution of the DOJ's
waiver policies that have threatened the corporate attorney-client
privilege. It also examines the costs and benefits of the waiver policy
and finds that the costs of the policy are substantial compared to the
benefits. Thus, it concludes that congressional intervention is necessary
to protect the corporate attorney-client privilege. Part IV argues that
Congress should enact the ACPPA or similar legislation, but that there
must be a provision in the legislation that permits courts to review
charging decisions where the corporation alleges that the DOJ violated

and interest groups including the ACLU, ABA, Chamber of Commerce, and Association of Corporate

Counsel).
4. See infra Part II (describing the evolution of the Department of Justice policies regarding the
federal prosecution of corporations from the Holder Memorandum, adopted June 16, 1999, to the
Thompson Memorandum, adopted January 20, 2003, to the McNulty Memorandum, adopted December
12, 2006, and finally to the Filip Guidelines, adopted August 28, 2008).
5. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.700, [hereinafter U.S.
ATTORNEYS'

MANUAL]

available

usao/eousa/foia_readingroom/usam/index.html.
6. S. 445, 111 th Cong. (2009).

7. Id.

at

http://www.justice.govl
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Thus, it outlines a proposal for overseeing prosecutorial

corporate charging decisions that involve waiver of the corporate
attorney-client privilege. It concludes that the benefits of this procedure
prevail over the costs and that this proposal is more effective than the
alternatives.
II. THE NEED FOR A STRONG CORPORATE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
IN CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

This Part examines the need for the corporate attorney-client
privilege in criminal investigations of corporate wrongdoing. It finds
that the corporate attorney-client privilege is justified both by the
corporation's right to present a defense to criminal charges and the longestablished utilitarian justification for the traditional attorney-client
privilege. Further, it concludes that the purported costs of the corporate

attorney-client privilege are either minimal or do not exist in the
criminal context.
A. Corporate CriminalLiability and the Attorney-Client Privilege

Corporate criminal liability is one method of regulating corporations.
This method of regulation has expanded as the number of federal
criminal laws has increased. 8 Ordinarily, criminal liability includes

imprisonment, fines, or community service. 9 A corporation, however, is
a fictional person that may only act through its agents and, thus, may be
held criminally liable for the acts, omissions, or failures of its agent.' 0
Courts hold a corporation vicariously liable for the acts of its employees
if the individual (i) acted within the scope and of employment;'' and (ii)
acted, at least in part, to benefit the corporation.12 The standard is not
stringent and a corporation may be held liable for the acts of a rogue
employee even if the corporation had rules prohibiting the employee's
8. TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N, THE
FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 9 n.l & app. C (1998) (ABA task force report chaired by Reagan
Attorney General Edwin Meese estimated federal criminal offenses exceeded 3,000).
9. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (2006) (outlining available sentences for individuals convicted of
crime).
10. See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 491-95 (1909)
(finding corporation liable because it acts only through its agents or employees whose knowledge and
purpose may be attributed to the corporation).
11. See United States v. 7326 Highway North, 965 F.2d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating agent's
knowledge of illegal act may be imputed to corporation if agent was "acting as authorized and motivated
at least in part by an intent to benefit the corporation" (citing United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238,
241-42 (1st Cir. 1982)).
12. See id.
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conduct.' 3 If a corporation is found liable for the criminal acts of its
employees, the corporation may be punished by fine. 14 In addition to
monetary penalties, a convicted corporation may suffer collateral
consequences. Often a company's stock price will decrease dramatically5
upon indictment and then even further upon criminal conviction.'
Indeed, a mere indictment can cause consumer confidence and the stock
price of a company to decrease so dramatically that even an overturned
conviction cannot save the company.' 6 In addition, a convicted
corporation may lose its ability to contract with the government.' 7 For
companies that depend heavily on their relationship with the government8
for their business, a conviction could mean the demise of the business.'
The low threshold for corporate criminal liability combined with the
collateral consequences of conviction increases the pressure on the
corporation to cooperate and avoid 9indictment for any alleged
wrongdoing on the part of its employees.'
When the government charges a corporation with criminal
13. See United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding
corporation liable for its employee's violation of the Sherman Act where the employee gave preferential
treatment to suppliers in violation of corporate policy).
14. See generally U.S SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (2009).
15. See U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 5, § 9-28.700 (acknowledging that investigations
may depress a corporation's stock price); The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel
in CorporateInvestigations: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 116 (2006)
(statement of Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen. of the United States).
16. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices Unanimously Overturn Conviction ofArthur Anderson,
N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/3l/business/3Iwireandersen.html (explaining that Arthur Anderson lost its clients after being indicted for obstruction of
justice charges and that even though the conviction was overturned there was no chance that Arthur
Anderson could come back as a viable business).
17. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2006) (mandatory exclusion of firms from participating in
Medicare and Medicaid upon conviction of program-related crimes); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78o(b)(4)(B)(i)-(iv)
(detailing the criminal offenses that trigger the SEC's enforcement power over registered brokers to
censure, place limitations on the broker's operations, revoke the broker's registration, or suspend the
broker up to twelve months); Jonathan R. Macey, Agency Theory and the Criminal Liability of
Organizations, 71 B.U. L. REv. 315, 326 (1991) (noting that firms convicted of government
procurement fraud often face formal and informal suspension or disbarment from doing business with
the government).
18. See, e.g., David R. Dearden, How to Avoid Medicare Provider Exclusion, PHYSICIAN'S
NEWS DIGEST, Mar. 2008, available at http://www.physiciansnews.com/law/308dearden.html
(explaining that exclusion from Medicare for a criminal conviction can lead to the "end of a career in
medicine" because insurers decredential medical providers who have been excluded from Medicare and
a medical practice cannot survive without reimbursements from insurers).
19. Preet Bharara, Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking
Prosecutorial Pressureon CorporateDefendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 86-87 (2007) ("No amount
of supplication, therefore, can overcome the mercilessness of the applicable legal doctrines; so long as
there is a hint of criminality by even a single lowly employee, the corporation's counsel has no leverage
and no bargaining power. Only the prosecutor can be merciful, and for his mercy the corporation
rationally chooses to cooperate in any way demanded.").
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misconduct, the corporation does not have the same protections as an
individual charged with a crime.20 Importantly, corporations do not
Thus,
have a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
corporations must comply with all government document requests
during an ongoing investigation even if it means turning over documents
that clearly establish the corporation's criminal liability. One of the few
protections that corporations have is the constitutionally mandated right
to retain legal assistance. 22 The Supreme Court has made clear that
"[t]he assistance of counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a
fair trial."2 3 The question is whether the corporation's communications
with counsel must remain confidential to make the right to legal
assistance meaningful.
Communications between counsel and corporate clients will only
remain private if those communications are protected by the attorneyclient privilege. The attorney-client privilege is "the oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications. 24 It is an exception to the
rule that the government is entitled to "every man's evidence" because it
protects from disclosure confidential communications between attorneys
The Federal Rules of Evidence have adopted the
and clients.
attorney-client privilege as it existed at common law. 26 The Supreme
Court has explained that the attorney-client privilege is intended "to

20. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981) (holding the Fourth Amendment gives
the government greater latitude to search commercial property than private homes); Oklahoma Press
Publ'g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946) (concluding "the Fifth Amendment affords no
protection by virtue of the self-incrimination provision, whether for the corporation or for its officers;
and the Fourth, if applicable, at the most guards against abuse only by way of too much indefiniteness or
breadth in the things required to be 'particularly described,' if also the inquiry is one the demanding
agency is authorized by law to make and the materials specified are relevant. The gist of the protection
is in the requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be unreasonable."); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75-76 (1906) (holding corporations are not entitled to protection under the Fifth
Amendment). See generally Peter J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate CriminalLiability: Seeking
a Consistent Approach to the ConstitutionalRights of Corporationsin Criminal Prosecutions,63 TENN.
L. REV. 793 (1996) (tracing the history of constitutional rights for corporations).
21. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 122 (1957) ("It is settled that a corporation is not
protected by the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.").
22. See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 340 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 67 (1932).
23. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972).
24. 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE INTRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2290, at 542 (John T.
McNaughton ed., 1961) (1904). The earliest reported cases recognizing the privilege date as far back as
the late 1500s to the early 1600s. Id. at 542 n. 1.
25. Id. § 2192.
26. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states that "the privilege of a witness.., shall be governed by
the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience." FED. R. EVID. 501; see also Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,
389 (1981) (citing this rule with approval).
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encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their

clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of
law and administration of justice. 27 This utilitarian justification for the
privilege is grounded in the recognition that legal consultation serves the
public interest.
Just like individuals, corporations need the best possible legal advice
in defending themselves against criminal charges. The Supreme Court
has long recognized that the privilege can apply to organizations as well
as individuals. 28 Prior to 1981, however, the Supreme Court had not
decided whether, for purposes of the privilege, any employee within the
corporation speaks for the corporation or if only upper-level employees
speak for the corporation. In Upjohn Co. v. United States,29 the Court
explicitly held that the privilege could apply to communications between

in-house counsel and corporate employees during an internal
investigation. 30 Upjohn rejected the "control group" test previously
used by some courts, which limited the corporate privilege to
communications between the attorney and members of the corporation's
upper management. 3' The Upjohn Court stated that the control group
test "frustrates the very purpose of the privilege by discouraging the

communication of relevant information by employees of the client to
attorneys seeking to render legal advice to the client corporation," 32 and
the Court declined to adopt another test. 33
The Upjohn Court
emphasized, however, that the "privilege extends only to
communications and not to facts." 34 The Supreme Court later made

27. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
28. As early as 1915, in United States v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., 236 U.S. 318,
336 (1915), the Supreme Court assumed, without deciding, that the privilege could apply to a
corporation.
29. Upjohn, 449 U.S. 383.
30. See id. at 396.
31. See id. at 390-94. The control group test:
analogizes the corporation to the human client, and the courts attempt to decide which
employees are the functional equivalent of the human brain. Thus, only employees high
enough in the corporate hierarchy to have authority to seek legal advice and to decide
whether to use it on behalf of the corporation fall within the control group. The identity
of these people may be clear at the very highest levels of corporate management;
however the uncertainty increases as one descends the corporate ladder. Lower-level
employees are clearly not within the control group, so the attomey-client privilege is not
available to encourage their communications with counsel.
Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Sanctifying Secrecy: The Mythology of the Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege,69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 157, 169-70 (1993).
32. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 392.
33. Id. at 396 ("Needless to say, we decide only the case before us.").
34. Id. at 395.
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clear that the privilege belongs to the corporation, not its employees,
and
35
that only the corporation may waive the attorney-client privilege.
Despite the Supreme Court's pronouncement affirming the corporate
attorney-client privilege, many commentators have attacked the
privilege's usefulness. 36 Thus, a cost-benefit analysis of the corporate
attorney-client privilege in the criminal context is necessary 37 before
examining the DOJ's waiver policy. If the costs of the privilege
outweigh its benefits, then the DOJ's waiver policy could be viewed as
restoring balance rather than doing harm.
B. The Costs and Benefits of the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilegein
CriminalInvestigations
The benefits of the corporate attorney-client privilege in criminal
investigations are similar to the benefits of the individual attorney-client
privilege. The corporate attorney-client privilege encourages clients to
speak openly and freely with their attorneys without fear of disclosure to
third parties. 38 In turn, attorneys are able to give reasonably informed
professional advice. If a client is concerned that his statements to his
attorney will possibly be used against him, the client may decide to
withhold some information. 39 As a result, the attorney's legal advice to
the client will be based on incomplete information. Preventing attorneys
from offering legal advice based on imperfect information is crucial to
the fair administration of justice.40
Some scholars have argued that the corporate attorney-client
35. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348-49 (1985)
(explaining that the privilege belongs to the corporation and is controlled by the corporation's
management and is normally directed by the corporation's officers and directors who must exercise the

privilege in accordance with their fiduciary duty to act in the best interest of the corporation).
36. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.

37. This discussion is limited to the corporate attorney--client privilege in criminal investigations
of corporate wrongdoing. It does not address the costs and benefits of the corporate attomey-client
privilege in private civil litigation.
38. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389 (explaining that the purpose of the privilege is "to encourage clients
to make full disclosure to their attorneys").

39. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) ("As a practical matter, if the client
knows that damaging information could more readily be obtained from the attorney following disclosure

than from himself in the absence of disclosure, the client would be reluctant to confide in his lawyer and
it would be difficult to obtain fully informed legal advice."); Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470

(1888) ("The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications between client and attorney is
founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having
knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed
of when free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.").
40. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 390 ("[T]he privilege exists to protect not only the giving of
professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer to enable
him to give sound and informed advice.").
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privilege is not necessary to encourage employees to share information
with the corporate attorney. 4 ' Critics believe that because the privilege
belongs to the corporation, not its directors, officers, or employees, the
personal incentive for lower-level employees to communicate truthfully
with a lawyer may not be as strong or-even present-in the corporate
context. 42 They believe that the threat of being fired for failure to
cooperate with the corporation's internal investigation is a more
effective motivator for confiding in the lawyer than the corporate
attorney-client privilege. 43
It is probably true that lower-level employees are motivated by fears
about job security, but that is not the whole story. The pertinent
question is whether these communications would take place in the
absence of the privilege, not whether the lower-level employees are
personally motivated by the privilege. If communications between
counsel and lower-level employees were not protected by the privilege,
it is unlikely that corporate decisionmakers would threaten lower-level
employees' jobs, either explicitly or implicitly, to convince them to
cooperate with counsel. It would not be in the corporation's best
interests to require lower-level employees to speak with counsel if the
government could discover and use the content of those communications
against the corporation. Because those communications are protected by
the privilege and not discoverable by the government, however, it is in
the best interests of the corporation to encourage lower-level employees
to communicate with counsel. It is only through those communications
that counsel will learn all the facts and be able to represent the
corporation effectively. Thus, the employee may not be directly
motivated by the privilege, but the corporation is motivated to direct
employees to communicate with counsel because of the privilege's
Therefore, in the corporate context, the privilege
protections.
encourages communications between lower-level employees and
counsel that would not take place in the absence of the privilege.
Another benefit of the corporate attorney-client privilege is that it
encourages voluntary compliance with the law and thereby fosters
41. See, e.g., Thornburg, supra note 31, at 157-58 (arguing that the traditional justifications for
the attorney-client privilege are only "myths" in the corporate setting); see also DAVID LUBAN,
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 233 (1988) (concluding the attorney-client privilege has
no justification in the organizational context); Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1, 33 (1998) (concluding the attorney-client privilege is "of dubious value to clients and
society as a whole").
42. Thornburg, supra note 31, at 173-74.
43. Id. at 175; In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 131 F.R.D. 374, 377 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (observing
that when lower-level employees reveal information to counsel they generally do so under orders from
their superiors and not in reliance on the corporation's privilege).
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44
effective administration of the laws and respect for the rule of law.
Corporations operate in a complex regulatory environment and often
need the advice of counsel to ensure observance of the law. 45 Because
the privilege encourages corporate clients to consult freely with their
attorneys, attorneys are better able to advise corporate clients about legal
requirements and recommend a lawful course of action to achieve
corporate objectives.4 6 Thus, counsel plays a pivotal role in assuring the
board of directors that the corporation is acting within the law. For
example, some corporations will be prompted by another company's
legal problems to hire an outside law firm to conduct an internal
investigation into the corporation's practices.4 7
In this type of situation, the audit committee (or special committee
created by the board of directors) of the corporation will want outside
counsel to produce a reliable and independent internal investigation for
investors to assure them that there are not any legal issues surrounding
Thus, outside counsel will determine
the corporation's practices.
whether misconduct occurred, the nature and scope of any misconduct,
who is involved and responsible, why the misconduct occurred, and how
widespread the problem may be. If outside counsel discovers a problem,
it can advise the company on the remedial steps necessary to insure that
the conduct does not recur, the need for disciplinary actions, as well as
48
the effectiveness of the current corporate compliance program.
Finally, outside counsel will be able to develop an appropriate response
to possible charges of wrongdoing and potentially obtain more lenient
treatment from government regulators for approaching them

44. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000).
45. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) ("In a
society as complicated in structure as ours and governed by laws as complex and detailed as those
imposed upon us, expert legal advice is essential.").
46. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 68 cmt. c (2000) (explaining

that the rationale behind the privilege is that confidentiality encourages full and frank disclosure by
clients); but see Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 148183 (1985) (explaining compelled disclosure is seen as inherently wrong because it causes embarrassment
and results in a breach of an entrusted confidence).
47. See, e.g., Eric Dash & Milt Freudenheim, Chief Executive at Health Insurer is Forced Out in
at
Inquiry,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
16,
2006,
available
Options
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/16/business/16unitedhtml?-r-2&oref-slogin (explaining that United
Health hired a law firm to investigate the potential backdating of stock options at its company and
noting that more than 100 companies had come under scrutiny for backdating options to maximize
compensation to employees).
48. See id. (explaining that the independent law firm that conducted an internal investigation
into backdated stock options recommended, inter alia, that the board fire the Chief Executive Officer,
replace all of the directors on its compensation committee who approved the backdated options, and
create new senior executive posts to oversee ethics and compensation).

1208

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LA W REVIEW

[Vol.78

voluntarily. 49 In the absence of the corporate attorney-client privilege,
however, corporations may decide to bury their heads in the sand and
hope that regulators will not discover any misconduct. Thus, the
corporate attorney-client privilege is beneficial because it encourages
corporations to take a proactive approach to complying with legal
requirements.
One commonly mentioned cost of the corporate attomey-client
privilege is the loss of information or evidence. 50 Because corporate
lawyers review documents and interview employees during internal
investigations, the lawyers may serve as repositories of information
gathered from sources throughout many levels of the corporation. 5 1
During the course of an investigation, corporate counsel will create, inter
alia, witness interview memoranda, factual summaries, and timelines.
The theory is that the corporation, as a fictional person, cannot easily
convey the attomey-gathered information to the government. 52 Thus,
without access to the corporate attorneys' records, the government has to
track down the widely dispersed information.
Of course the underlying facts are not privileged.53 As corporations
do not have a Fifth Amendment privilege, the government can subpoena
the relevant documents to learn the facts of the case.54 Once the
government is familiar with the documents, the government can call
employees before a grand jury to question them about the documents
and their knowledge of, or involvement in, the alleged wrongdoing. 5
The government may also grant immunity to a knowledgeable employee

49. See, e.g., Letter from Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General, Dep't of Health and Human
at
2006),
available
(Apr.
24,
Care
Providers
to
Health
Servs.,
(explaining
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/openletters/Open%2OLetter/20to%2OProviders%202006.pdf
that the Office of Inspector General will consider voluntary disclosure of violations favorably).
50. Fischel, supra note 41, at 7-8 (arguing that the attorney-client privilege increases the costs of
discovery and can be used to shield information from discovery completely).
51. Thornburg, supra note 31, 203-04 (noting defendant corporations have ready access to
internal corporate documents and employees, whereas those attempting to pierce the corporate veil must
undergo the difficult task of deposing scores of employees at all levels of a corporation to learn the
relevant information).
52. See, e.g., William R. McLucas et al., The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the
CorporateSetting, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621, 639 (2006) (observing that the government has
taken to "deputizing" private counsel who conduct internal corporate investigations).
53. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981).
54. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 699 (1944).
55. Grand juries exercise their investigatory function by issuing subpoenas under FED. R. CRIM.
P. 17. See also Daniel C. Richman, GrandJury Secrecy: Plugging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 339, 345 (1999) (explaining that the "greatest use of grand juries as investigative
tools is in the white collar area" because white collar witnesses are more likely to succumb to the
pressure of the grand jury).
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to convince the employee to give the government the entire story.56
Certainly, there is a cost to the government to conduct its investigation,
but the nature of the cost, in theory, is no different than the cost imposed
on the government in the criminal prosecution of an individual.57
Indeed, if the corporation did not retain counsel, the government would
encounter the same costs of investigating the corporation. Thus, the
government is in the same position in criminal investigations with or
information generated from the corporate attorney-client
without the
58
privilege.
An additional cost often mentioned in applying the privilege to
corporations is that the corporation may manipulate the privilege to hide
information used for business (i.e., nonlegal) purposes. 59 The theory
here is that corporations will send copies of ordinary business material
to internal counsel to establish that those materials are privileged and
In criminal
shield them from discovery in future litigation.
investigations, however, it is much less likely that the corporation is
funneling business information through attorneys to conceal that
information from the government. The communications that would
occur between counsel and the corporation in a criminal investigation
would be directly related to the counsel's legal purpose in representing
the corporation. Indeed, in a criminal investigation the prosecution is
interested in obtaining the attorney-prepared witness interview
memoranda, timelines, investigation reports, and factual summaries.
Thus, it may be true that manipulation of the privilege is a cost of the
corporate attorney-client privilege in the civil context, but it cannot
properly be judged as a cost in the criminal context.
The corporate attorney-client privilege makes a corporation's right to
retain legal assistance meaningful. It permits the corporation to
communicate openly with counsel to formulate a defense to criminal
56. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (explaining the rules for granting immunity to witnesses in
exchange for their testimony).
57. The actual cost of investigating a corporation is much higher than investigating an individual.
See Michael L. Seigel, Corporate America Fights Back: The Battle Over Waiver of the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1, 13-20 (2008) (describing the costs associated with investigating a
corporation); see also United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 371 n.205 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting
the government had reviewed 5 to 6 million pages of documents, transcripts of 335 depositions, and 195
income tax returns). But see Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organizations,
71 B.U. L. REV. 421,425 (1991) (arguing that it is less burdensome to prosecute an organization than an
individual because the government may not need to establish who committed the offense or the mental
state of the individual actors).
58. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395 (explaining that in internal investigations "[a]pplication of the
attorney-client privilege to communications such as those involved here, however, puts the adversary in
no worse position than if the communications had never taken place").
59. Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate
Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 493-94 (1987).
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charges. It also permits the corporation to control its destiny by
proactively conducting internal investigations to determine if the
corporation has engaged in any wrongdoing and the appropriate
response. The corporation is able to do this without the threat that the
government will be privy to each conversation that corporate counsel
has with the corporation's employees and agents. While the government
may argue that by upholding the corporate attorney-client privilege,
corporations may deny the government information or even obstruct the
government's investigation, the government's ability to discover the
facts is nether helped nor hurt by the existence of the corporate attorneyclient privilege. As the benefits to the corporate attorney-client
privilege significantly outweigh its costs, the corporate attorney--client is
valuable and worth protecting. Thus, any infringement on the corporate
attorney-client privilege must be carefully scrutinized. This is necessary
to ensure that the privilege is not weakened by ill-advised policy
considerations.

III. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT

OF THE CURRENT DOJ CHARGING
POLICY AND THE PROPOSED ACPPA

This Part examines the development of the DOJ corporate charging
policy, from the 1999 Holder Memorandum 60 to the 2008 Filip
Guidelines, 6 1 and their role in creating a "culture of waiver." 62 It also
explores the costs and benefits of the DOJ's waiver policy, concluding
that the negative consequences of the waiver policy overshadow its
positive aspects. Finally, this Part analyzes the proposed AttorneyClient Privilege Protection Act to determine whether it is an appropriate
response to the DOJ's waiver policy. This Part concludes that although
the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act is a suitable answer to the
DOJ waiver policy, it falls short of responding to all of the dangers of
the DOJ waiver policy because it does not include a remedy for its
violation.

60. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Deputy Att'y Gen., to All Component Heads & U.S.
available
at
16,
1999)
[hereinafter
Holder
Memorandum],
Attorneys
(June
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/documents/reports/1999/charging-corps.PDF.
61. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 5, § 9-28.700.
62. See The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 4 (2006) (statement of Sen.
Patrick Leahy, Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (arguing the DOJ's waiver policy "has created a
dangerous 'culture of waiver.').
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A. History of DOJ ChargingPolicy
Prior to 1999, when the DOJ issued its first guidance memorandum
on prosecuting corporations, DOJ standards for charging corporations
were unclear. Prosecutorial discretion shrouded the DOJ's charging
considerations in secrecy. It was widely understood, however, that
prosecutors valued cooperation. Traditionally, prosecutors conducting a
criminal investigation of a corporation would seek cooperation by
granting individual employees immunity in exchange for their
testimony, issuing grand jury subpoenas for documents, or issuing grand
jury subpoenas requiring particular employees to testify.6 3 Over the past
several years, however, the DOJ has shifted to a policy of encouraging
corporations to waive their attorney-client privilege and work product
64
protection to obtain the information needed to prosecute them.
Because corporations typically hire outside counsel to perform an
internal investigation when they discover that they are under scrutiny by
the DOJ, the DOJ's policy shift makes it possible for the DOJ to benefit
from outside counsel's labor by obtaining access to the results of
internal investigations.
The first iteration of the waiver policy was promulgated in June of
1999 when then-Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder issued a
memorandum entitled "Federal Prosecution of Corporations. 6 5 The
Holder Memorandum, as it became known, identified eight factors that
prosecutors were permitted to weigh in deciding whether to indict a
corporation. 66 The factor most important here is the corporation's
willingness to cooperate with the government during its investigation.
The Holder Memorandum explained:
In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation's timely
and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate
with the government's investigation may be relevant factors. In gauging
the extent of the corporation's cooperation, the prosecutor may consider
63. Julie R. O'Sullivan, Does DOJ's Privilege Waiver Policy Threaten the Rationales
Underlying the Attorney-Client Privilegeand Work Product Doctrine? A Preliminary "No ", 45 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1237, 1240 (2008).
64. See Thompson Memorandum, supra note 1. See generally McLucas et al., supra note 52
(outlining the rapid decline of the attorney-client privilege in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom
scandals).
65. Holder Memorandum, supra note 60.
66. The eight factors include: (1) "[t]he nature and seriousness of the offense"; (2) the frequency
of misconduct within the corporation; (3) the corporation's history of engaging in comparable conduct;
(4) the "corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in
the investigation of its agents"; (5) the "existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance
program"; (6) the "corporation's remedial actions"; (7) "[c]ollateral consequences"; and (8) the
"adequacy of non-criminal remedies." Id. at II.A.
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the corporation's willingness to ... disclose the complete results of its
internal investigation,
and to waive the attorney-client and work product
67
privileges.

Prosecutors and practitioners alike, however, believed that the Holder
Memorandum was merely advisory. 68 In addition, the waiver request
was largely seen as a response to the advice-of-counsel defense 69 that
had arisen more frequently in the highly regulated business community.
Accordingly, the Holder Memorandum received little attention in the
legal community and did not significantly alter how corporations
conducted internal investigations.
After a wave of corporate scandals involving major companies such
as Enron 70 and WorldCom, 7 1 President Bush created a Corporate Fraud
Task Force to make the prosecution of financial crimes a DOJ priority.72
One of the duties of the Corporate Fraud Task Force was to change
rules, regulations, and policy to improve the effective investigation and
prosecution of significant financial crimes.73 On the same day that the
President issued the executive order creating the Corporate Fraud Task

67. Id.
68. See Jason McLure, The Life and Death of the Thompson Memorandum, LEGAL TIMES, Dec.
18, 2006, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/WCnews065.
69. A defendant may negate proof of specific intent by establishing the defense of good faith
reliance on advice of counsel. To take advantage of this defense, the defendant must show that after
making a full disclosure of all relevant facts he relied in good faith on his attorney's advice. See, e.g.,
United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1544 (11th Cir. 1984). However, this defense presents
significant risks.
Because the defense requires the disclosure of privileged attorney-client
communications, some courts have held that the defense constitutes a waiver of the privilege. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991).
70. On December 2, 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy with $13.1 billion in debt for the parent
company and an additional $18.1 billion for affiliates. The company used special purpose entities
(SPEs), loopholes in the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and mark-to-market
accounting in an effort to hide debt. Sixteen Enron employees were guilty of crimes committed at
Enron, and Arthur Andersen, a major accounting firm, dissolved as a result of the scandal. Wendy
Zellner & Stephanie Anderson Forest, The Fall of Enron, Bus. WK., Dec. 17, 2001, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/0151/b3762001 .htm.
71. In the summer of 2002, Mississippi based WorldCom filed for bankruptcy following the
discovery of a $3.8 million dollar fraud accomplished through creative accounting methods used to
mask the company's declining financial condition. WorldCom's accounting department perpetrated the
fraud through capitalization of line costs on the balance sheet and inflated revenues with bogus
accounting entries. By the end of 2003, it was estimated the company's total assets had been inflated by
about $11 billion. The former CEO, Bernard Ebbers, was found guilty of all criminal charges, including
fraud, conspiracy, and filing false documents with regulators. The former CFO, controller, accounting
director, and accounting managers all pled guilty in accordance with plea agreements. Jones
Jonesington, WorldCom Scandal: A Look Back at One of the Biggest Corporate Scandals in U.S.
at
http://www.associatedcontent.com/
History,
Mar.
08
2007,
available
article/l 62656/worldcomscandal a lookback at one.html.
72. Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002).
73. Id. § 3(c)(iii).
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Force, he also released a Corporate Responsibility Fact Sheet, which set
forth the President's proposal to fight corporate fraud.74 Among other
goals, the President called for harsher penalties for corporate crimes.7 5
The Corporate Fraud Task Force put the Holder Memorandum at the top
of its priority list for policy revisions. Just six months after the
President created the Corporate Fraud Task Force, then-Deputy Attorney
General Larry Thompson issued a memorandum to replace the Holder
Memorandum entitled "Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Thompson
the
known as
became
which
Organizations,"
The Thompson Memorandum was the crowning
Memorandum.76
achievement of the Corporate Fraud Task Force.
The Thompson Memorandum was intended to "increase[] [the]
emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity of a corporation's
cooperation. 7 7 Like its predecessor, the Thompson Memorandum
provided that cooperation included waiving the attorney-client and work
product privileges. 78 The Thompson Memorandum, however, elevated
the importance of waiver by removing the "only" from the Holder
Memorandum's admonishment that waiver of the privilege was "only
one factor in evaluating the corporation's cooperation., 79 In addition,
the Thompson Memorandum no longer referred to the attomey-client
and work product privileges as "privileges." Instead, the Thompson
Memorandum referred to them as "protections." 80 Thus, the attorneyclient privilege became the attorney-client protection in the Thompson
Memorandum. 81 These were the first signals that the DOJ intended to
afford the attorney-client and work product privileges less respect in the
course of their investigations than they had in the past. Although the
policy stated that prosecutors were permitted to request waiver in
"appropriate circumstances, 8 2 the Thompson Memorandum failed to

74. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, The White House, Corporate Responsibility Fact
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
at
available
2002),
9,
(July
Sheet
news/releases/2002/07/20020709- .html.

75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Thompson Memorandum, supra note 1.
Id.
Id. at lI.A.

79. Lonnie T. Brown, Jr., Reconsidering the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege:A Response to

the Compelled-Voluntary Waiver Paradox, 34 HOFSTRA L. REv. 897, 936 (2006); Thompson
Memorandum, supra note I.
80. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 1, at VI.
81. Compareid., with Holder Memorandum, supra note 60, at VI.
82. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 1, at VI; see also Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective
Cooperation by Business Organizationsand the Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV.

587, 592 (2004) (discussing the waiver provision).
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explain what those appropriate circumstances might have been.83 Thus,
prosecutors used their discretion to determine that virtually every case
was an appropriate
circumstance to seek waiver of the attorney-client
84
privilege.
In evaluating cooperation, the Thompson Memorandum also
instructed prosecutors to examine whether the corporation appeared to
protect its culpable employees and agents. 85 Thus, advancing attorneys'
fees, entering joint defense agreements, sharing information with
employees, or retaining employees without disciplining them for their
misconduct, were all factors to weigh against the corporation in
Collectively, these
determining the corporation's cooperation. 86
changes appeared to make cooperation the most significant factor in the
prosecutor's decision whether to indict a corporation.
The Thompson Memorandum also added a ninth factor for the
prosecutor to consider--"the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals
responsible for the corporation's malfeasance." 87 At the same time, the
Thompson Memorandum noted that it would be a minority of cases in
which a corporation or partnership was itself subjected to criminal
charges.8 8 Thus, even though the Thompson Memorandum claimed to
address when to charge a corporation, the DOJ's focus had clearly
shifted to punishing individual employees where possible instead of the
corporation. The threat of prosecuting the corporation, however, would
serve as the DOJ's leverage in seeking cooperation from the corporation.
The Corporate Fraud Task Force and the implementation of the
Thompson Memorandum dramatically changed the atmosphere of
internal investigations. Often in the very first meeting between the
83. See The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 24-26 (2006) (statement of
Andrew Weissman, Partner, Jenner & Block, LLC) [hereinafter Weissman Statement] (explaining that
there was a lack of uniform standards regarding requests for waivers of the attomey-client privilege).
84. See id. (explaining that some prosecutors interpreted the Thompson Memorandum to permit
them to seek a blanket waiver of all attorney-client communications, other than communications
regarding how to defend the case, from the very outset of a criminal investigation); see also ASS'N OF
CORPORATE COUNSEL ET AL., THE DECLINE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE CORPORATE

available
at
SURVEY
RESULTS
(Mar.
6,
2006),
CONTEXT:
=
http://www.acc.com/vl/public/Surveys/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&amp;pageid 16306.
85. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 1, at VI; see also Buchanan, supra note 82, 592-93
(explaining the culpability factor of the test for making charging decisions).
86. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 1, at VI; see also Holder Memorandum, supra note 60,
at VI.
87. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 1, at IlA; William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler,
CorporateCrime and Making Amends, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1307, 1313 n.24 (2007).
88. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 1; see also Bharara, supra note 19, at 79 (describing
the Department's broad discretion as "an expression of untrammeled power in theory, but also
suggestive of reasonable restraint in practice").
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government and corporate counsel, the DOJ would inquire whether the
corporation was prepared to cooperate by waiving the attorney-client
89
privilege and turning over the results of its internal investigation.
Ultimately, aggressively using the Thompson Memorandum's
cooperation provision assisted the government in securing convictions of
corporations and individuals, but as discussed below, the impact on
corporations and their employees was far less rosy.
B. The Costs and Benefits of the DOJ Waiver Policy
For the government and the public, the biggest advantage of the
waiver policy was that it made government investigations into corporate
criminal conduct more efficient and less costly. The government did not
need to go through the initial expense of conducting a large-scale
investigation, such as securing witness cooperation agreements or sifting
through thousands of documents. Instead, the government was able to
piggyback off of the work of corporate counsel. Thus, the government
was able to pursue more corporate wrongdoers with fewer resources,
including individuals who otherwise would have been granted immunity
for the government to gain the information necessary to prosecute the
corporation. The DOJ's new cooperation strategy was immensely
successful. In the first ten months of the of the Corporate Fraud Task
Force's existence, it obtained over 250 corporate fraud convictions,
handled over 320 investigations involving more than 500 subjects, and
recovered over $2.5 billion in fines, forfeitures, and restitution. 90
The government's approach was understandable. Undoubtedly, when
corporations are involved in accounting scandals, the culpable actors
within the corporation often employ a wide variety of accounting tricks
to make it difficult to discover the fraud. Enron, where the executives
created a financial house of cards to conceal billions in debt from
unsuccessful projects and deals, is an example of the difficult job that
the government would have in uncovering accounting fraud on its
own. 9 1 Certainly the government's waiver policy assisted in bringing
accounting frauds to light, much to the benefit of the public. But the
difficulty of proving fraud, standing alone, does not justify stripping
89. See Weissman Statement, supra note 83.
90. CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, FIRST YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2.2 (2003). The
Task Force's second year report revealed that the DOJ had won over 500 corporate fraud convictions or
guilty pleas and had charged over 900 defendants with corporate fraud. CORPORATE FRAUD TASK
FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2.3 (2004).
91. CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, FIRST YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 90, at
2.3 & 2.4; CORPORATE FRAUD TASK FORCE, SECOND YEAR REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 90,
at 2.3.

1216

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol.78

corporations of one of the few constitutional protections that they
possess in criminal investigations. Even if the difficulty of proving
fraud in these cases justified the waiver policy, the DOJ did not confine
using its policy to those situations where it was impossible to ascertain
the facts without waiver of the attorney-client privilege. Instead, the
DOJ applied its waiver policy across the board in the name of efficiency.
While convenience and efficiency are laudable goals, the Supreme Court
"do not overcome the policies served by the
has made clear that they 92
attorney-client privilege."

For the corporation and its employees, the consequences of
cooperating with the government by waiving the corporate attorneyclient privilege were far-reaching. First, it put corporate counsel in a

difficult ethical situation. If counsel knew that the corporation may
waive the privilege, counsel was essentially an agent of the government
conducting an investigation on its behalf and providing the government
with all the findings. 93 Corporate counsel were in the unenviable
position of trying to zealously represent their clients while being
beholden to the demands of the government. 94 This was particularly

difficult because counsel had to decide how to convince the
corporation's employees to cooperate when there was a very real
possibility that the corporation would turn over any communications that

implicated the employee in the wrongdoing. 95 If corporate counsel
92. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981). The Court explained that
"[d]iscovery was hardly intended to enable a learned profession to perform its functions... on wits
borrowed from the adversary." Id. (quoting Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J.,
concurring)).
93. See Sarah Helene Duggin, Internal Corporate Investigations:Legal Ethics, Professionalism,
and the Employee Interview, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 859, 865 (2003). Duggin explains that the
biggest dilemmas for counsel include: "when and how to disclose to an interviewee that counsel
represents the business entity, not the individual; what to say in response to questions such as 'Do I need
my own lawyer?'; and what to advise corporate clients with respect to government demands for
privilege waivers, constituent requests for advancement of attonmeys' fees, and related issues." Id.
94. See George Ellard, Making the Silent Speak and the Informed Wary, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
985, 985-86, 994 (2005) (concluding the Thompson Memorandum's approach to law enforcement
"deputizes" private counsel in certain circumstances).
95. Typically, corporate attorneys advise employees that they represent the corporation, not the
individual employee, and that the corporation considers the conversation between the attorney and the
employee to be protected by its attorney-client privilege. Therefore, corporate attorneys ask employees
to keep the content of their conversations confidential. They also advise the employees that the
corporation, not the employee, has the power to waive the attorney-client privilege and reveal the
content of the conversation. Prior to the waiver policy, corporate counsel was able to downplay the fact
that the corporation could decide to disclose the communication to the government because it was
unlikely to happen in a typical case. Alternatively, counsel could reassure the employee that the
corporation had no reason to believe that the individual engaged in any wrongdoing and that counsel
was merely trying to gain an understanding of the facts so that counsel can properly advise the
corporation. With the pressure on the corporation to waive the privilege to demonstrate cooperation,
however, counsel cannot assure employees that the corporation does not intend to waive the privilege.
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suspected that a particular employee was involved in the wrongdoing,
counsel had to decide whether to advise the employee to retain
independent counsel before speaking with corporate counsel. There was
also the possibility that counsel's belief that the employee participated in
criminal conduct could arise during the course of the interview. At that
point, corporate counsel had to decide whether she was obligated to stop
the interview and advise the employee to retain separate counsel or
continue the interview and uncover as much information as possible for
the corporation and the government. Finally, counsel's position between
the client and the government put employees at risk for obstruction of
justice charges based on the theory that once a corporation decided to
waive the privilege, counsel was essentially an agent of the government
and any lie to counsel would necessarily be passed on to the
The DOJ's waiver policy turned representing a
government. 96
corporation in a criminal investigation into an ethical minefield fraught
with dangers for the corporation and its employees at every turn.
Second, once the corporation waived the privilege as to the
government, the privilege was waived as to all parties. In other words,
corporations could not "selectively waive" the privilege to gain favor
with the government and then strategically reassert that privilege to

protect the disclosed information from all other current or future
litigants. 97 Thus, waiver placed the results of the internal investigation
directly into the hands of any potential civil litigant. Future litigants

Even if it is true at the time the statement is made, it could be potentially misleading because the
corporation may decide to waive the privilege to stave offprosecution. The more explicit the warning to
the employee regarding the potential for the employee's statements to be turned over to law enforcement
and/or the possible need for independent counsel, the less likely it is than an employee is willing to be
forthcoming with the attorney. Duggin, supra note 93, at 942-45.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, No. H-06-080, 2006 WL 1984467, at *6 (S.D. Tex. July
14, 2006) (explaining that Greg Singleton was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) for obstruction of
justice based on the claim that his company's outside counsel was "acting as an arm of the investigating
agencies," that Singleton lied to the outside counsel, and that Singleton believed that his statements to
outside counsel would be given to the investigating federal agencies); United States v. Kumar, 04 CR
846(S-2) (ILG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96142, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2006) (explaining that Sanjay
Kumar, the Chief Executive Officer of Computer Associates International, Inc. was indicted for
obstruction of justice charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) based, in part, on allegations that he lied
when the company's outside law firm interviewed him and that outside counsel passed those lies on to
the government).
97. In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 303 (6th Cir.
2002) ("The client cannot be permitted to pick and choose among his opponents, waiving the privilege
for some and resurrecting the claim of confidentiality as to others, or to invoke the privilege as to
communications whose confidentiality he has already compromised for his own benefit."); In re
Steinhardt Partners, L.P., 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Philippines, 951
F.2d 1414 (3d Cir. 1991); Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981). But see
Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (recognizing selective
waiver doctrine).
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who successfully obtained internal investigation reports due to the
corporation's cooperation with the government essentially had a
roadmap to proving liability against the corporation. Therefore, the
monetary cost of cooperating with the government by waiving the

attorney-client privilege could be very high. 98
Third, the waiver policy damaged the corporation's relationship with
its employees. Once employees understood that the corporation would

turn them and their privileged statements over to the government to save
the corporation from prosecution, employee distrust and resentment
would build. 99 In addition to the damage to the employer-employee

relationship, the waiver policy threatened to infringe on individual
employee rights, such as the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The potential
infringement on employees' constitutional rights came to light in United
States v. Stein, 100 which was the first time a court had the opportunity to

scrutinize the DOJ's preindictment conduct under the waiver policy.
The opinion in that case was concerned with the Thompson
Memorandum's cooperation factor, and specifically with the
advancement of attorneys' fees. The court found that KPMG, one of the
world's largest accounting firms, had a long standing policy of paying
the legal fees of its employees even if they were charged with crimes. 101
KPMG changed this policy, however, after a meeting between KPMG
management and DOJ prosecutors where the prosecutors told KPMG
that "[the DOJ] would look at any discretionary payment of [attorneys']
fees by KPMG 'under a microscope."",10 2 In addition, the DOJ was
98. See, e.g., In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 311 (Boggs, J., dissenting) ("The court's rule
[rejecting selective waiver] does nothing more than increase the cost of cooperating with the
government.").
99. Ellen S. Podgor, White-Collar Cooperators: The Government in Employer-Employee
Relationships, 23 CARDoZO L. REv. 795, 803 (2002) (explaining that pitting employers and employees
against each other in an attempt to obtain the benefits of cooperation, "interferes with the overriding
fiduciary employment relationship."). Podgor also notes that corporations are in a superior position to
their employees when it comes to negotiating cooperation. Corporations can pressure employees to
cooperate by threatening dismissal. Corporations are also more likely to be the "first in the race to the
courthouse to serve in the role of government cooperator." Id. at 805.
100. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
101. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
102. Id. at 353. After the meeting, KPMG decided to limit preindictment advancements to
$400,000 and required full cooperation with the government as a condition of the advancement of legal
fees. After further correspondence with the DOJ, KPMG decided to immediately cut off all attorney fee
advancements if an employee were later indicted. As the investigation of KPMG employees progressed,
KPMG's attorneys asked government prosecutors to notify them whenever a particular KPMG
employee was not cooperating fully with the investigation. Whenever the DOJ gave KPMG notice that
an employee was not cooperating with the investigation, KPMG would threaten to terminate the
payment of the employee's legal fees unless the government informed KPMG within the next ten
business days that the employee was willing to submit to a government interview. In some instances,
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hostile to independent counsel representing KPMG employees during
government interviews, so the DOJ pressured KPMG to inform its
employees that they could attend government interviews without
independent counsel to represent them.' 0 3 The court found that the
portion of the Thompson Memorandum touching upon attorneys' fees
and the actions of the prosecutors violated the KPMG employeedefendants' Fifth10 4 and Sixth 0 5 Amendment rights. Thus, according to
the court, the pressure exerted by the Thompson Memorandum and the
federal prosecutors to cut off attorneys' fees to KPMG employees under
investigation necessarily interfered with the employees' ability to defend

employees did not agree to an interview with the government and KPMG promptly fired the employee
and cut off payment of the employee's legal fees. Although KPMG would be permitted to make those
types of determinations regarding the payment of legal fees without violating the constitutional rights of
their employees, the court found that the actions of KPMG were properly characterized as attributable to
the government because of the DOJ policies as outlined in the Thompson Memorandum. Specifically,
the court found that KPMG's departure from its long standing policy of paying the legal fees of its
employees without limit was due to the Thompson Memorandum's cooperation factor. Id. at 353-60.
103. KPMG sent a letter to its employees regarding the investigation. The letter "advised ... [the]
recipients [that they] had a right to be represented by counsel if they were contacted by the government,
mentioned some advantages of consultation with counsel, and stated that KPMG had arranged for
independent counsel for those who wished to consult them." Id. at 346. The DOJ prosecutors told
KPMG that they were "'disappointed with [the letter's] tone' and . . . 'one-sided presentation of
potential issues' and demanded that KPMG send out a supplemental memorandum in a form they
proposed." Id. After a sentence in the letter telling employees that they are "free to obtain their own
counsel," the government wanted KPMG to add the following language: "or to meet with investigators
without the assistanceof counsel." Id. KPMG succumbed to the DOJ's pressure and amended its "Q &
A" form for its employees so that the form more explicitly communicated that employees could deal
with government representatives without counsel. Id.
104. Id. at 365. The court found that the Thompson Memorandum violated the Fifth Amendment
in that it impermissibly impeded a criminal defendant's Due Process right to be treated fairly during the
criminal process. Id. The court declared that the right to fairness in the criminal process at a minimum
means that "a criminal defendant has a right to obtain and use in order to prepare a defense resources
lawfully available to him or her, free of knowing or reckless government interference." Id. at 361. The
court concluded that even the most minimal criminal defense would cost between $500,000 and $1
million. Id. at 362 n.163 (explaining that this case represented the largest tax fraud case in United States
history with at least 5 million pages of documents, 335 depositions, and 195 income tax returns).
105. Id. at 365-66. While the Sixth Amendment right to counsel normally attaches upon
indictment, the government's actions and policies to cut off the defendants' attorneys' fees
preindictment had the purpose of limiting the defendants' access to counsel post-indictment. According
to the court, the DOJ's preindictment conduct impermissibly restricted the employees' right to counsel
post-indictment by pressuring KPMG to cut off advancing attorneys' fees to those KPMG employees
who had been indicted. Id. at 366-67. To remedy these constitutional violations, the court decided to
exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the KPMG defendants' claims against KPMG for the advancement of
attorneys' fees. In addition, because the court found that some of the KPMG defendants made proffers
to the government that they would not have made had KPMG not threatened to cut off their attorneys'
fees, Judge Kaplan requested that the parties brief that issue more fully to determine which statements to
the government the court ought to suppress. Id. at 373. A month later, the court concluded that the
government impermissibly coerced the proffers of two of the KPMG defendants; the court therefore
suppressed these statements. Id. at 337-38.
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themselves. 1
The costs of the waiver policy were significant to the business
community. It became difficult for corporate counsel to operate freely
during the course of an internal investigation because the government
was constantly looking over counsel's shoulders. In turn, counsel
confronted difficult ethical choices in interviewing employees and
employees' rights were jeopardized by the waiver policy. If the
corporation succumbed to the government's pressure to waive the
privilege, it would be vulnerable to future lawsuits supported by its own
internal investigation. This "culture of waiver" threatened the corporate
attorney-client privilege and everything it stood for. In contrast, the
government leveraged its power under the Thompson Memorandum to
save time and money. Ultimately, this dynamic would lead to a
backlash against the government, explored below.
C. Pressureto Change the DOJ Waiver Policy Mounts
The legal community quickly mobilized against the DOJ's threat to
the corporate attomey-client privilege.
In September 2004, the
American Bar Association (ABA) formed a Task Force on the AttorneyClient Privilege.' 0 7 Its goal was to preserve and protect the attorneyclient privilege and work product doctrine.' 0 8 On May 2, 2006, the
106. Judge Kaplan explained that a competent defense lawyer would not advise his corporate
client to feel free to advance attorneys' fees to its employees in the face of the language in the
Thompson Memorandum itself. Indeed, it would be irresponsible to take the chance that prosecutors
might view it as "protecting... culpable employees and agents." Id. at 364 (alteration in original). The
court applied strict scrutiny constitutional analysis and held that the Thompson Memorandum's
inclusion of advancement of attorneys' fees in its cooperation factor was unconstitutional. Id. Under
substantive Due Process judicial review, laws that restrict fundamental liberty interests are subject to the
most rigorous judicial review: strict scrutiny analysis; the law is constitutional only if it is narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Id. at 360. While the Supreme Court has never explicitly
characterized the right to fairness in criminal proceedings as a fundamental liberty interest, the Stein
court found cases supporting this extension. Id. at 360-61. The court then held that the Thompson
Memorandum's restrictions on the right to fairness in the criminal proceedings were not narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Id. at 364.
107. See TASK FORCE ON ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE, AM. BAR ASS'N, REPORT (2005),
availableat http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materialshod/report.pdf.
108. The ABA Task Force held a series of public hearings on the privilege waiver issue and
received testimony from numerous legal, business, and public policy groups. See The Thompson
Memorandum 's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate Investigations: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 88 (2006) (statement of Karen J. Mathis, President, Am. Bar.
Ass'n). The Task Force successfully enacted a new ABA policy endorsing the corporate attorney-client
privilege and work product doctrine and resisting DOJ policies that threaten them. The ABA and its
Task Force have also worked along side a broad array of business and legal groups to lobby the DOJ to
reexamine its waiver policy and convince the Sentencing Commission to remove the 2004 privilege
waiver amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines that permitted judges to examine waiver of the
attomey-client privilege and work product doctrine in determining cooperation. Id. On April 5, 2006,
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ABA sent a letter to Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, which
expressed the ABA's concerns over the DOJ's privilege waiver policy
and urged the DOJ to adopt the ABA Task Force's revisions to the
Thompson Memorandum. 10 9 The ABA proposed amending the DOJ's
policy by prohibiting prosecutors from seeking privilege waivers during
investigations; specifying the types of factual, nonprivileged information
that prosecutors may request from companies as a sign of cooperation;
and clarifying that any voluntary waiver of privilege shall not be
considered when assessing whether the entity effectively cooperated. "10
These suggested revisions to the DOJ's policy would have balanced
rectifying the problem of government-coerced waiver and maintaining
prosecutors' ability to gather the important factual information necessary
to effectively enforce the law. But the DOJ responded by simply
reasserting the existing waiver policy."' Although the DOJ seemed to
indicate its unwillingness to engage the legal community in a discussion
regarding its waiver policy, the ABA forged ahead with its campaign to
preserve the attorney-client privilege. 112
The pressure on the DOJ was not just from the ABA. On September
5, 2006, ten prominent former senior DOJ officials from both major
political parties-including three former Attorneys General, three
former Deputy Attorneys General, and four former Solicitors Generalsubmitted a letter to Attorney General Gonzales opposing the privilege

the Sentencing Commission voted unanimously to overtum the 2004 privilege waiver amendment to the
Sentencing Guidelines and the change became effective on November 1, 2006. Id. at 9.
109. Letter from Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen.
(May
2,
2006),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/
letters/attyclient/060502letteracprivgonz.pdf.
110. Memorandum from The Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Am. Bar Ass'n, to Heads
of Department
Components
& U.S.
Attorneys
(Feb.
10,
2006),
available
at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/attyclient/060502letter-acprivgonz.pdf
11. Letter from Crystal R. Jezierski, Director, Office of Intergovernmental and Public Liaison,
U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Michael S. Greco, President, Am. Bar Ass'n (July 18, 2006), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 109_senate-hearings&docid=f:34117.pdf.
112. On August 8, 2006, the ABA approved a resolution, sponsored by the ABA Task Force on
Attorney-Client Privilege and the New York State Bar Association, opposing govemment policies,
practices and procedures that erode employees' constitutional and other legal rights by requiring,
encouraging, or permitting prosecutors to consider certain factors in determining whether a company or
other organization has been cooperative during an investigation. Task Force on Attomey-Client
Privilege & N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, Report to the House of Delegates (Aug. 8. 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/media/docs/302Brevised.pdf. These factors include whether the organization (I)
provided or funded legal representation for an employee, (2) participated in a joint defense and
information sharing agreement with an employee, (3) shared its records or historical information about
the conduct under investigation with an employee, or (4) declined to fire or otherwise sanction an
employee who exercised his or her Fifth Amendment rights in response to government requests for
information. Id.
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waiver provisions of the Thompson Memorandum." 3 In this letter, the
former officials voiced many of the same concerns previously raised by
the ABA and urged the DOJ to amend the Thompson Memorandum "to
state affirmatively that waiver of attorney-client privilege and work
product protections should not be a factor in determining whether an
14
organization has cooperated with the government in an investigation."'
This letter from former DOJ senior officials indicated that opposition to
the DOJ's waiver policy was not limited to corporate attorneys.
Pressure on the DOJ reached a fever pitch in summer 2006 when
Judge Kaplan, U.S. District Judge for the Southern District of New
York, found portions of the Thompson Memorandum and actions of
federal prosecutors under its guidance unconstitutional." 5 The Stein
decision, described in subpart III.B, supra, was a huge victory for
opponents of the Thompson Memorandum, giving them a much-needed
boost in gaining Congress's attention. On September 12, 2006, the U.S.
Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on "The Thompson
Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations."' 16
The battle lines between the Bush Administration and the attorney
interest groups were clearly drawn. Then-Deputy Attorney General Paul
McNulty testified on behalf of the waiver policy."17 He credited the
Thompson Memorandum for over 1,000 corporate fraud convictions,
restoring the public's confidence in the market, and providing
corporations predictability." 8 McNulty claimed that waiver was not a

113. Letter from former Senior Justice Department Officials to Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen.,
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/
at
available
2006),
5,
(Sept.
priorities/privilegewaiver/2006sep05_privwaiv-frmrdojltr.pdf.
114. Id.
115. United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 365-66 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
116. The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in CorporateInvestigations:
HearingBefore S. Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong. (2006).
117. See The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations:Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary,109th Cong. 110 (2006) (statement of Paul J.
MeNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter McNulty Statement]. He began his testimony by recounting
the large scale bankruptcy of Enron and other companies at the beginning of the millennium that led to
the call for greater accountability for corporations and the formation of the Corporate Fraud Task Force.
McNulty explained that since that time, the DOJ had obtained over 1000 corporate fraud convictions.
McNulty asserted that the DOJ's more aggressive stance on corporate crime helped to restore the
public's confidence in the market. McNulty also claimed that the Thompson Memorandum had reined
in prosecutorial discretion because it required prosecutors to look at collateral consequences to
shareholders, not just whether the prosecutor could obtain a conviction under the law, when making a
charging decision. Id. at 110-11.
118. Id. at 113 (explaining that without the Thompson Memorandum, "the federal criminal justice
system would be a much harsher, less predictable, and less transparent environment for corporations and
their counsel").
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"litmus test" for cooperation. 119 Nevertheless, McNulty admitted that
the DOJ believed the best way for a corporation to communicate all of
the facts to the government was for the corporation to turn over its
internal investigation report. 120 McNulty also defended the Thompson
Memorandum's consideration of attorneys' fee advancements to
employees (at issue in the Stein decision).' 2 1 He made the broad
assertion that the "Thompson Memo does not, and could not, drive
corporate policy or practice."' 122 McNulty concluded by stating his
belief that the Thompson Memorandum appropriately struck the balance
between the interests of the business community and the investing
23
public.1
Former Attorney General Edwin Meese spoke in opposition to the
Thompson Memorandum and offered concrete suggestions to improve
124
it.
Meese recommended (1) removing any mention of waiver of
either the attorney-client privilege or work product protection from the
corporate charging policy; (2) eliminating any reference to the payment
119. Id. at 114. McNulty claimed that, in most cases, the DOJ's waiver requests are made only to
gain a quicker, more accurate understanding of the facts. Id. He explained that if a company can
communicate the facts and identify the wrongdoers without waiving any privileges, the government is
satisfied. Id. Of course this contradicts the language of the Thompson Memorandum itself which states
that waiver of the attorney-client and work product privileges may be necessary so that the government
can be satisfied that the corporation had made a complete disclosure of the facts to the government.
120. Id. at 114-15.
McNulty maintained that, even in the absence of the Thompson
Memorandum's cooperation factor, companies would still frequently waive privileges to speed up the
government's investigation. Id. McNulty also noted that corporate waiver is in the taxpayers' interest
because the DOJ can save time and financial resources by obtaining the corporation's internal
investigation. Id. Finally, MeNulty asserted that the waiver policy was necessary because corporations
overly assert the attorney-client and work product privileges by running all of their documents, even
those that concern purely business matters, through in-house counsel. This in turn leads to prolonged
pre-trial litigation regarding the privilege. Id. at 117-18. This argument, however, is a bit disingenuous
since the issue is whether the government should have access to evidence that would not exist but for the
attorney's involvement in the internal investigation, not pre-existing documents.
121. Id. at 119-20. He argued that advancement of attorneys' fees is only one "small part of the
overall assessment as to whether a corporation cooperated." Id. at 119. He stated that, "[t]he untold
story is that the government's investigation is generally enhanced when experienced and informed
defense counsels represent targeted employees." Id. at 120. Of course, this assertion flies in the face of
the prosecutors' concerted efforts in the Stein case to conduct interviews of KPMG employees without
the benefit of counsel. McNulty further asserted that whether to advance fees "is the company's choice
alone." Id. at 121. MeNulty failed to address Judge Kaplan's contrary findings in the Stein case where
KPMG changed its policy regarding the advancement of attorneys' fees due to pressure from federal
prosecutors and the Thompson Memorandum.
122. Id. at 121.
123. Id. at 122 (explaining that individual defendants waive their privilege against selfincrimination regularly and that corporations should not receive preferable treatment simply because
they have more money).
124. The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in CorporateInvestigations:
Hearing Before S.Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 18 (2006) (statement of Edwin Meese, former
Attorney General) [hereinafter Meese Statement].
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of employees' attorneys' fees; and (3) explicitly stating that the
government will only seek waiver in "exceptional circumstances," such
as the crime fraud exception. 125 In the interim, Meese proposed that the
DOJ provide uniform national policies on waiver, require that a
prosecutor obtain authorization at the national level before making a
and provide statistics on the regularity of DOJ waiver
waiver request,
26
1
requests.
Chamber of Commerce President Thomas Donohue discussed the
adverse effects of the waiver policy.' 27 He explained that a corporation
that is unwilling to waive the privilege is immediately labeled
"uncooperative," which damages the company brand and shareholder
value. 128 Donohue called on Congress to "invalidate provisions of
DOJ's Thompson Memorandum and similar policies at other federal
agencies that prevent executives and employees from freely, candidly
Donohue
and confidentially consulting with their attorneys."' 129
explained that "[a]s long as the Department of Justice exercises a policy
that threatens companies with indictment if they do not waive their
a front-line
privilege, companies will feel compelled to waive-whether
' 30
not."'
or
waiver
the
requests
prosecutor 'formally'
The strong opposition to the waiver policy from business leaders and
former Attorney Generals placed the DOJ in the position of justifying
and defending its policy. There was no question that the policy led to a
substantial number of convictions and settlements. But, the DOJ had
difficulty convincing the business community and Congress that the
ends justified the means.
D. The McNulty Memorandum Is Born
Following the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, the ABA and
other groups continued their crusade to convince the DOJ to change the
Thompson Memorandum. The DOJ refused to change its policy until
Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Attorney-Client Privilege
125. Meese Statement, supra note 124, at 19. The crime fraud exception prevents a client from
asserting the attomey-client privilege when the communication was for the purpose of effecting a future
or ongoing crime or fraud. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORKPRODUCT DOCTRINE 392 (4th ed. 2001).
126. Meese Statement, supra note 124, at 19.
127. See The Thompson Memorandum's Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations:HearingBefore S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 71 (2006) (testimony of Thomas
Donohue, President and CEO, U.S. Chamber of Commerce).
128. Id. at 72.
129. Id. at 71.
130. Id. at 73.
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Protection Act of 2006 in December 2006.131
The proposed Act
prohibited a federal agent from demanding, requesting, or conditioning
treatment
on 32the
disclosure
of attorney-client
privileged

communications.'

In response to the proposed legislation, the DOJ adopted a revised

version of Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
written by then-Deputy Attorney General Tom McNulty.' 33 The
McNulty Memorandum, as it became known, required federal
prosecutors to consider the same nine factors enumerated in the
Thompson Memorandum when determining whether to charge a
corporation. 134 It did, however, make some changes to the cooperation
factor.
The McNulty Memorandum, unlike the Thompson
Memorandum, restricted the prosecutors' ability to request waiver of the
attorney-client privilege.
The McNulty Memorandum limited

prosecutors' ability to request waiver to situations where there was "a
legitimate need for the privileged information to fulfill their law

enforcement obligations."' 135 If the prosecutor found a legitimate need,
131. S. 30, 109th Cong. §3 (2006).
132. Id. §3(b). Specifically, it prohibited a federal agent from holding the assertion of attorneyclient privilege against the corporation when making a charging decision, as well as the provision of
legal fees or expenses to an employee or a joint defense agreement with an employee. The Act also
provided that Federal agents could not make a charging decision based on the corporation sharing
information pertinent to the investigation with an employee or failing to fire an employee who exercised
his constitutional rights or other legal protections in response to a government request for information.
133. See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of Dep't Components
& U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Memorandum], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty-memo.pdf.
134. Id. Those factors include:
(1) the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public, and
applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations for
particular categories of crime; (2) the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the
corporation, including the complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate
management; (3) the corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior criminal,
civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it; (4) the corporation's timely and
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation
of its agents; (5) the existence and adequacy of the corporation's pre-existing compliance
program; (6) the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an
effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to replace
responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to
cooperate with the relevant government agencies; (7) collateral consequences, including
disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders and employees not proven
personally culpable and impact on the public arising from the prosecution; (8) the
adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation's malfeasance;
and (9) the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.
Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
135. Id. at 8, 9 (in determining whether a legitimate need exists, the prosecutor is to balance the
"important policy considerations underlying the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine and
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she had to first seek "purely factual information, which may or may not
1
be privileged, relating to the underlying misconduct ('Category I).9 136
The revised procedure required prosecutors to obtain written
authorization from the U.S. Attorney before requesting that a
corporation waive the attorney-client or work product protections for
Category I material. 137 The government was permitted to consider the
corporation's response to the waiver request in determining whether the
corporation had cooperated in the government's investigation. 138 Thus,
under the McNulty Memorandum, the government was still permitted to
hold the refusal to waive the attorney-client privilege against the
corporation in assessing cooperation. Indeed, there was no real change
Memorandum
from the Thompson Memorandum because the Thompson 139
purported to limit waiver requests to Category I materials.
If the corporation complied with the government's request to waive
the privilege with respect to Category I material, but the prosecutor
found that the factual information "provide[d] an incomplete basis to
conduct a thorough investigation," the prosecutor could then request that
the corporation provide attorney-client communications or nonfactual
attorney work product (Category II). 140 The McNulty Memorandum
explained that Category II information should only be sought in "rare
circumstances."'141 Before requesting that a corporation waive the
attorney-client or work product protections for Category II information,
the law enforcement needs of the government's investigation"); O'Sullivan, supra note 63, at 1268
(explaining this provision of the McNulty Memorandum).
136. Examples of Category I information include, "copies of key documents, witness statements,
or purely factual interview memoranda regarding the underlying misconduct, organization charts created
by company counsel, factual chronologies, factual summaries, or reports (or portions thereof) containing
investigative facts documented by counsel." McNulty Memorandum, supra note 133, at 9; O'Sullivan,
supra note 63, at 1269.
137. The prosecutor's request must include law enforcement's "legitimate need" for the
information and set forth the scope of the waiver sought. A copy of each waiver request and
authorization for Category I information must be maintained in the files of the United States Attorney.
For federal prosecutors in litigating Divisions within Main Justice, waiver requests for Category I
information must be submitted for approval to the Assistant Attorney General of the Division. The
United States Attorney must provide a copy of the request to, and consult with, the Assistant Attorney
General for the Criminal Division before granting or denying the request. If the United States Attorney
authorizes the request, the United States Attorney must communicate the request in writing to the
corporation. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 133, at 9.
138. Id.
139. Compare id., with Thompson Memorandum, supra note I.
140. Category II material included legal advice given to the corporation before, during, and after
the underlying misconduct occurred. Some examples of Category II material included "attorney notes,
memoranda or reports (or portions thereof) containing counsel's mental impressions and conclusions,
legal determinations reached as a result of an internal investigation, or legal advice given to the
corporation." McNulty Memorandum, supra note 133, at 10.
141. Id.
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the U.S. Attorney had to obtain written authorization from the Deputy
Attorney General. 142 If the Deputy Attorney General authorized the
request, the U.S. Attorney was required to communicate the request in
writing to the corporation.
The prosecutor was prohibited from
considering a corporation's refusal to waive the privilege for Category II
information when making a charging decision. 143 Prosecutors could,
however, favorably consider a corporation's willingness to grant the
government's waiver request in determining whether a corporation had
cooperated in the government's investigation. 144
Another factor the prosecutor had to weigh in assessing a
corporation's cooperation was whether the corporation appeared to, or
actually did, protect its culpable employees and agents. 145 Therefore, if
the corporation retained the employees who engaged in misconduct
without penalizing them, or made information about the government's
investigation available to employees by entering a joint defense
agreement, the government was permitted to consider those factors in
weighing "the extent and value of a corporation's cooperation."146
Unlike the Thompson Memorandum, however, the McNulty
Memorandum stated that prosecutors generally should not consider
whether a corporation was paying its employees' attorneys' fees when
deciding whether to indict the corporation. 147 Prosecutors were allowed
to consider advancement of attorneys' fees only when the "totality of the
circumstances" demonstrated that the corporation advanced attorneys'
fees for the purpose of hindering a criminal investigation. 148
Despite the procedural hurdles that prosecutors had to clear before

142. The authorization request must set forth law enforcement's legitimate need for the
information and identify the scope of the waiver sought. The Deputy Attorney General must keep a
copy of each waiver request and authorization for Category 11 information in his files. For federal
prosecutors litigating in Main Justice, the Assistant Attorney General must submit waiver requests for
Category 11information for approval to the Deputy Attorney General. Id. at 10-11.
143. Id. at 10.
144. Id. If a corporation voluntarily offers privileged documents without a request by the
government, federal prosecutors are not required to obtain authorization. The federal prosecutor must,
however, report voluntary waivers to the United States Attorney or the Assistant Attorney General in the
Division where the case originated. Id. at 11. A record of that report must be maintained in the files of
that office. Id.
145. Id. at 11.
146. Id.
147. Id. This provision was changed in direct response to the decision in United States v. Stein,
435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), where Judge Kaplan held that the government had acted
unconstitutionally when it threatened KPMG.
148. McNulty Memorandum, supra note 133, at I I n.3. The McNulty Memorandum explained
that when these circumstances were present, the prosecutor had to get permission from the Deputy
Attorney General before considering this factor in his charging decisions. Prosecutors were instructed to
follow the authorization process established for waiver requests of Category II information. Id.
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seeking a privilege waiver, the McNulty Memorandum fell short of
adequately protecting the attorney-client privilege. The McNulty
Memorandum, like its predecessor, left it to the DOJ-rather than the
corporation-to determine when it was appropriate to waive the
attorney-client privilege.
The McNulty Memorandum created an
unnatural division of attorney-client privileged materials by labeling all
attorney-created documents from the internal investigation as factual
information (Category I) and labeling all communications that contained
the attorney's mental impressions, such as legal advice, as nonfactual
information (Category II). 149 Even the supposed factual materials in
Category I would necessarily include the attorney's mental
impressions. 150 In addition, it permitted prosecutors to consider a
corporation's unwillingness to waive the attorney-client privilege with
respect to Category I documents when determining whether the
Further, while
corporation had cooperated with the government.
prosecutors could not hold a corporation's refusal to waive the attorneyclient privilege with respect to Category II materials against it, they
could look favorably upon a corporation's willingness to turn over those
materials. So long as the government could offer a benefit for waiver, a
similarly situated corporation that did not waive the attorney-client
privilege necessarily received less favorable treatment.
Due to the underlying similarities between the Thompson and
McNulty Memoranda, the DOJ failed to please the business community
and Congress.
The changes were negligible and the Thompson
Memorandum's "culture of waiver" still lurked in the background of the
McNulty Memorandum.1 51 Therefore, the battle over the corporate
attorney-client privilege remained just as intense, if not more so, than
before the DOJ adopted the McNulty Memorandum.
E. The Current ChargingPolicy: The Filip Guidelines
As the DOJ continued to receive intense pressure from Congress and
various interest groups, it again amended its corporate charging policy in

149. See supranotes 136 and 140 and accompanying text.
150. Keith Paul Bishop, The McNulty Memo-Continuing the Disappointment, 10 CHAP. L. REV.
729, 740-41 (2007) (noting the line between Category I and Category I1 information "can often be
indistinct at best" as many "factual reports" are necessarily opinion-laden).
151. See Lauren E. Taigue, Justice Department's Policy on Corporate Prosecutions Under
Attack: United States v. Stein Assails Thompson Memorandum, 52 VILL. L. REv. 369, 406 (2007)
(stating that the "culture of waiver" that existed under the Thompson memorandum would largely be
continued by the McNulty Memorandum); Bharara, supra note 19, at 93 (arguing the Thompson
Memorandum's "culture of waiver" persisted even after the Thompson Memorandum was replaced by
the McNulty Memorandum).
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August 2008 to further restrict DOJ attorneys' ability to request
attorney-client privileged information from corporations. This time,
however, the DOJ made the corporate charging policy part of the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual rather than a freestanding directive. The new
corporate charging policy, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business
Organizations, commonly called the Filip Guidelines after then-Deputy
Attorney General Mark Filip, instructs prosecutors to consider the same
1 52
nine factors provided in the Thompson and McNulty Memoranda.
The major difference between the Filip Guidelines and the prior
iterations of the corporate charging policy is its explanation of the
cooperation factor. The Filip Guidelines go into much greater detail
regarding the benefits of cooperation for both the government and the
corporation. The Filip Guidelines note that the government's lack of
knowledge regarding what happened, where to find the evidence, and
which individuals are to blame for the illegal corporate actions, could
lead to the government refusing to consider a "disposition short of
indictment of the corporation."' 153 Further, the Filip Guidelines state that
cooperation assists the government by allowing prosecutors to avoid
extended delays that could impede their ability to discover and deal with
the corporate crimes. 154 It explains that corporations can benefit from
cooperation because the government will direct its investigative
resources in a manner that will not upset the corporation's business and,
152. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 5, § 928.300, instruct prosecutors to examine the following factors when deciding whether to bring charges or

negotiate a plea:
(1)the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the public, and
applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations for
particular categories of crime (see USAM 9-28.400); (2) the pervasiveness of
wrongdoing within the corporation, including the complicity in, or the condoning of, the

wrongdoing by corporate management (see USAM 9-28.500); (3) the corporation's
history of similar misconduct, including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement
actions against it (see USAM 9-28.600); (4) the corporation's timely and voluntary
disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its
agents (see USAM 9-28.700); (5) the existence and effectiveness of the corporation's
pre-existing compliance program (see USAM 9-28.800); (6) the corporation's remedial
actions, including any efforts to implement an effective corporate compliance program or
to improve an existing one, to replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate
wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies
(see USAM 9-28.900); (7) collateral consequences, including whether there is
disproportionate harm to shareholders, pension holders, employees, and others not proven
personally culpable, as well as impact on the public arising from the prosecution (see
USAM 9-28.1000); (8) the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the
corporation's malfeasance; and (9) the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory
enforcement actions (see USAM 9-28.1100).
153. Id. § 9-28.700.
154. Id.
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the corporation may earn credit for its
perhaps more importantly,
55
cooperation efforts.'
The Filip Guidelines also include a new section on the attorney-client
and work product protections which affirms their importance in the legal
system.156 The Guidelines then acknowledge the controversy over the
DOJ's prior privilege waiver policies, but claim that the policies were
not used coercively to force corporations into waiving the attorneyclient privilege. 157 They clarify that the government does not need
corporations to waive their attorney-client and work product privileges
to demonstrate cooperation; instead the government is really seeking the
158
facts known to the corporation regarding the alleged illegal conduct.
With respect to internal investigations, the Filip Guidelines explain that
a corporation that uses attorneys to conduct its internal investigation will
be held to the same standard of cooperation as a corporation that uses
nonlawyers. 159 Accordingly, even if the results of a corporation's
internal investigation are privileged because lawyers conducted the
investigation, the corporation still must turn over the relevant facts to the
government if it wants to receive cooperation credit. 160 The Filip
Guidelines explain that "so long as the corporation timely discloses
relevant facts about the putative misconduct, the corporation may
receive due credit for such cooperation, regardless of whether it chooses
to waive privilege or work product protection in the process."' 61 The
Filip Guidelines also affirm (1) that the government may not compel a
corporation to make disclosures and (2) a corporation's failure to
provide relevant evidence does not mean that the corporation should be
indicted. 162 The Guidelines note that the government retains the
discretion to charge even the most cooperative corporation if it is
Thus, they make clear that
required in the interests of justice.
factor, but it alone is not
potential
mitigating
is
a
relevant
"[c]ooperation
' 63
dispositive."'
Although the Filip Guidelines make a point of stating that the
corporate attorney-client privilege is valued and respected by the DOJ,
they still distinguish between the information gained from an internal

155. Id.

156. Id. § 9-28.710.
157. Id.

158. Id. § 9-28.720.
159. Id.

160. Id.
161.

Id.

162. Id.
163. Id.
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investigation and legal advice sought outside of the "fact-gathering
process" of an internal investigation. The distinction is close to the

controversial

Category

I-Category II division in the McNulty

Memorandum. 164
The Filip Guidelines note that communications
regarding legal advice that are independent of the fact-gathering part of

the internal investigation "lie at the core of the attorney-client privilege"
and need not be disclosed as a condition for the corporation's eligibility
to receive cooperation credit.' 65 Similarly, nonfactual work product,
such as an attorney's mental impressions or legal theories, need not be
revealed to the government. 166 Thus, the Filip Guidelines appear to
recharacterize any legal involvement with the internal investigation as
factual, so whether it may technically be protected by the attorney-client

privilege is irrelevant. So long as the prosecuting attorney asks only for
the relevant facts and never specifically requests waiver of the attorneyclient privilege, the attorney has not violated the guidelines. But, if facts
are understood to mean what they meant in the McNulty Memorandum,
i.e., to include interview memoranda, factual chronologies created by

counsel, and reports containing investigative facts, then providing those
facts would probably lead to a full waiver of the attorney-client
privilege. Indeed, some lower courts have held that if a corporation
makes these types of factual disclosures to the government then the

corporation has waived the privilege on any underlying attorney notes
and memoranda in subsequent litigation. 167 These courts were operating
under a prior version of the corporate charging policy where
corporations attempted to cooperate, but still preserve the privilege, by
168
verbally sharing the facts gathered from the internal investigation.
Thus, the requirement in the Filip Guidelines that a corporation disclose
all relevant facts to be eligible for cooperation, as opposed to directing
164. See supra notes 136 and 140 and accompanying text.
165. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 5, § 9-28.720. The Filip Guidelines note, however,
that a corporation claiming the advice of counsel defense should expect a waiver request so that the
government may evaluate whether it is a legitimate defense. Id. They also state that any
communications between attorney and client made in furtherance of a crime or fraud are not entitled to
the protection of the attorney-client privilege. Id.
166. See id.
167. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Roberts, 254 F.R.D. 371 (N.D. Calif. 2008) (ordering a
law firm to disclose all documents, factual information, and attorney notes previously made available to
the SEC in an SEC action against the former Vice President of the client for whom the firm conducted
the investigation); Ryan v. Gifford, No. 2213-CC, 2008 WL 43699 (Del. Ch. Jan. 2, 2008) (ordering the
production of all documents produced in the course of an internal investigation when some of those
documents were previously disclosed to third parties including NASDAQ and the SEC).
168. See e.g., Lance Cole, Corporate Criminal Liability in the 21st Century: A New Era?, 45 S.
TEX. L. REV. 147, 169 (suggesting that it may be possible for corporations to cooperate with the
government by providing relevant factual information without disclosing privileged attorney-client
communications or work-product "that reflects the opinions or legal theories of counsel").
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the government to the appropriate documents and individuals,
jeopardizes the corporate attorney-client privilege in later litigation.
Another new provision in the Filip Guidelines describes the type of
corporate conduct that amounts to obstruction. Under the Thompson
Memorandum, the prosecutor was permitted to consider the
advancement of attorneys' fees and the use of joint defense agreements
against the corporation in assessing its cooperation.' 69 The Filip
Guidelines make clear, however, that prosecutors "should not take into
account whether a corporation is advancing or reimbursing attorneys'
fees or providing counsel to employees, officers, or directors under
investigation or indictment."' 70 Similarly, the Filip Guidelines maintain
that "mere participation by a corporation in a joint defense agreement
does not render the corporation ineligible to receive cooperation credit,
and prosecutors may not request that a corporation refrain from entering
into such agreements."''7 Importantly, prosecutors are also prohibited
from requesting that corporations refuse to pay their employees'
attorneys' fees. 172 These changes in the Guidelines were a direct
reaction to United States v. Stein, which garnered a great deal of media

attention. 173
Finally, the Filip Guidelines include a provision regarding oversight
concerning demands for waivers of attorney-client privilege or work
product protection. The Filip Guidelines state that "[c]ounsel for
corporations who believe that prosecutors are violating such guidance
are encouraged to raise their concerns with supervisors, including the
174
appropriate United States Attorney or Assistant Attorney General."
The section explains that these allegations are subject to '"potential
investigation through established mechanisms." 175 There is no means to
hold supervisors accountable if they choose not to investigate allegations
of misconduct. Ultimately, the Filip Guidelines require the DOJ to
169. Thompson Memorandum, supra note 1, at VI (characterizing the payment of attorneys' fees
and joint defense agreements as the corporation "protecting its culpable employees and agents").
170. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 5, § 9-28.730 (reserving the right of the prosecutor to
hold the payment of attorneys' fees against the corporation if it were used in a manner that would
otherwise constitute criminal obstruction of justice such as advancing fees with the agreement that the
employee or agent stick to a version of the facts that the employee and corporation know to be false);
see also Brandon L. Garrett, CorporateConfessions, 30 CARDOzO L. REv. 917, 928 (2008).
171. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-28.730. The guidelines do advise corporations to "avoid
putting itself in the position of being disabled, by virtue of a particular joint defense or similar
agreement, from providing some relevant facts to the government and thereby limiting its ability to seek
such cooperation credit." Id.
172. Id.
173. 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
174. U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 5, § 9-28.760.
175. Id. (emphasis added).
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police itself on waiver of the corporate attorney-client privilege, which
is exactly what caused the "culture of waiver" to begin with.
Although the Filip Guidelines are an improvement over prior versions
of the corporate charging guidelines, they still leave the corporate
attorney-client privilege vulnerable. Thus, the need for legislation to
address the corporate attorney-client privilege remains.
F. The Legislative Remedy: The Attorney-Client Privilege Protection
Act of 2009
Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Attorney-Client Privilege
2009.177
Protection of 2009176 (ACPPA) in the Senate on February 13,
The ACPPA begins by explaining the importance of the attorney-client
privilege. 178 The ACCPA notes that guarding the attorney-client
privilege from compelled disclosure promotes voluntary compliance
with the law. 179 Further, the ACPPA provides that corporations are
better able to have compliance programs and conduct internal
investigations if there is "clarity and consistency" regarding the
The ACPPA asserts that government
attorney-client privilege.1 80
officials should be able to conduct their investigative work while
respecting the attorney-client privilege and the work product
It notes that the DOJ and other agencies' policies
doctrine. 181
undermine the adversarial system of justice by pushing organizations to
waive attorney-client privilege and work product protections to avoid
indictment or other sanctions.' 82 Thus, the purpose of the ACPPA is to
the corporate attorneyinstitute "clear and practical limits" to safeguard
83
protection.'
product
work
and
client privilege
1. The ACPPA's Provisions
The ACPPA prohibits an agent or attorney of the United States from:

176. S. 445, 111 th Cong. (2009).
177. The McNulty Memorandum was released on December 12, 2006. Senator Specter
introduced the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007 less than one month later on January
12, 2007. S. 186, 110th Cong. (2007). Senator Specter reintroduced the bill in 2008. S. 3217, 110th
Cong. (2008). The 2007 version of the bill passed the House of Representatives by a voice vote on
November 13, 2007, but was never reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee.
178. S. 445, § 2.
179. Id. § 2(a)(2).
180. Id. § 2(a)(4).
181. Id. § 2(a)(5).
182. Id. § 2(a)(7).
183. Id. § 2(b).
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(1) demanding or requesting that an organization, its employees or agents,
waive the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine; (2)
offering to reward or actually rewarding an organization, its employees or
agents, for waiving the attorney-client privilege or the work product
doctrine; and (3) threatening adverse treatment or penalizing an
to waive the attorneyorganization, its employees or agents, for declining
84
client privilege or work product protection. 1
Further, the ACPPA prohibits an agent or attorney of the United
States from making a civil or criminal charging or enforcement decision
based on a good faith assertion of the protection of the attomey-client
privilege or the work product doctrine; payment of legal fees for an
employee or agent; good faith entrance into a joint defense agreement
between the organization and one or more of its employees or agents;
information sharing between an organization and its current or former
employees or agents; and failing to terminate the employment of any
employee or agent because of that agent or employee's decision to
exercise personal constitutional rights or other legal protections in
response to a government request.1 85 With respect to voluntary
disclosures, the ACPPA does not "prohibit an organization from
making, or an agent or attorney of the United States from accepting, a
voluntary and unsolicited offer" to waive the attorney-client privilege
and work product protection, but the agent or attorney of the United
States may not consider the privileged or otherwise protected nature of
the material when making a charging decision or determining
whether
86
1
government.
the
with
cooperating
is
the organization
2. Criticisms of the ACPPA
Although many critics of the DOJ's waiver policy hailed the ACPPA
as a much-needed intervention, the proposed legislation has not been
without criticism. One criticism of an earlier, but nearly identical,
version of the ACPPA raised by Professor Liesa L. Richter is that it
eliminates a company's incentive to offer privileged information to the
government because there is no reward for such a disclosure.' 8 7 The
ACPPA states that a prosecutor may not consider the "privileged or
otherwise protected nature of the material voluntarily provided" when
184. Id. § 3(b)(1).
185. Id. § 3(b)(2).
186. Id. § 3(d).
187. Liesa L. Richter, The Power of Privilege and the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act:
How CorporateAmerica Has Everyone Excited About the Emperor's New Clothes, 43 WAKE FoREST L.
REV. 979, 1000-01 (2008) (examining the Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, H.R. 3010,
110th Cong. (2007)).
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making a charging decision or when deciding whether the organization
has cooperated.188 This provision does not appear to suggest that an
organization could not receive cooperation credit for producing
privileged information to the government; instead, it seems to indicate
that the government must judge the information on its usefulness
without crediting the organization simply because of the information's
privileged status. Thus, it is the information itself, and not its status, that
should guide the prosecutor in deciding whether to charge a corporation
or award cooperation credit. Corporations would still have an incentive
to produce privileged information if they believe it would help the
government understand the case and potentially keep them from being
prosecuted.
Professor Richter seems to be arguing that organizations should have
an incentive to waive the attorney--client privilege even if it does not
serve their clients' interests in the investigation. The incentive that we
should be trying to create, however, is an incentive to cooperate in the
investigation. Professor Richter's criticism of the ACPPA appears to
make waiving the attorney-client privilege synonymous with
cooperating with the government. But the purpose of the ACPPA is to
separate these two concepts to protect the sanctity of the attorney-client
privilege. Corporations must be able to cooperate without being forced
to waive the attorney-client privilege. The government is most anxious
to obtain evidence that would not exist but for the attorney's
involvement in the investigation, e.g., interview memoranda and time
lines prepared by attorneys. But, there are certainly ways to cooperate
and convey the information in those documents without waiving the
attorney-client privilege. For instance, corporate counsel could inform
the government of the identity of the witnesses with the most relevant
information and make those individuals available for questioning.
Counsel could share their compilation of the critical documents rather
than forcing prosecutors to wade through millions of documents. Both
these steps could save the government investigation time and the
government would be free to reward the corporation for its cooperation.
Thus, an organization's incentive to cooperate with the government
would not be diminished because of the ACPPA.
Some might argue that there is no need for the ACPPA now that the
DOJ has adopted the Filip Guidelines and made them a part of the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual. Because the Filip Guidelines prohibit prosecutors
from requesting attorney-client privileged information from
corporations, the argument goes, they adequately safeguard the
188. S. 445, § 3(d)(2).
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There are several problems with this
attorney-client privilege.
argument. First, unlike legislation which would require hearings,
bicameralism, and presentment to change, the Attorney General may
change the U.S. Attorneys' Manual at any time for any reason or for no
reason at all. Therefore, after the fire storm about the "culture of
waiver" dies down, the U.S. Attorney would be free to direct the Deputy
Attorney General to amend the guidelines. In terms of predictability, it
would be much better to have a legislative rule in place rather than a
changeable guideline. The DOJ rule on requesting waiver of the
corporate attorney--client privilege has changed three times in four years.
Second, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual is not enforceable in any
court. 189 Thus, if a U.S. Attorney disregards the guidelines and demands
that a corporation waive the attorney-client privilege, the corporation
has no recourse. On the other hand, if legislation protected the attorneyclient privilege, presumably there would be legal consequences for
failure to abide by the rule. Therefore, legislation would be preferable to
the U.S. Attorneys' Manual because there would be a mechanism to
ensure compliance with the rule.
Third, the Filip Guidelines do not apply widely to all government
agencies like the ACPPA does. For example, the SEC is not bound by
the DOJ policy and could require a corporation to waive the attorneyclient privilege to demonstrate cooperation.' 90
Therefore, the
government would be free to use the corporation's failure to waive the
privilege in a criminal action against them in pursuing a civil action. So
long as the waiver policies across government agencies are not uniform,
the risk to the privilege remains.
The Filip Guidelines do not adequately address the "culture of
waiver" that has developed over the last several years. Although the
Guidelines prohibit a U.S. Attorney from demanding waiver of the
corporate attorney-client privilege, they do not provide any remedy if a
U.S. Attorney violates the policy. Instead, they instruct corporations to
raise their concerns with the U.S. Attorney's supervisor. 19 1
189. Tom Lininger, Sects, Lies and Videotape; The Surveillance and Infiltration of Religious
Groups, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1201, 1268 (2004); see also Rory K. Little, The Future of the FederalDeath
Penalty, 26 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 529, 573 (2000) (predicting the manuals would be immediately
withdrawn if they were held to be enforceable in court).
190. On October 13, 2009, the SEC confirmed that it entered a waiver agreement wherein Bank of
America agreed to disclose documents related to the legal advice Bank of America received in
connection with its merger with Merrill Lynch. By disclosing the privileged documents to the SEC
Bank of America also made the documents available to the many other state and federal regulators
investigating Bank of America's merger with Merrill Lynch. See Kara Scannell et al., BofA to Hand
Over Documents Related to Its MerrillDeal, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2009, at A2 1.

191. U.S. ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 5, § 9-28.760 (explaining that "[thike any other
allegation of attorney misconduct, such allegations are subject to potential investigation through
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Corporations do not have a right to bring a court proceeding to enforce
the Filip Guidelines or any other aspect of the U.S. Attorneys'
Manual. 192 And without any formal procedure for pursuing a violation,
a report to the supervisor may do little more than aggravate the U.S.
Attorney handling the case. This could damage a client's position even
more. Similarly, the ACPPA does not address an appropriate remedy. It
merely prohibits a U.S. Attorney from requesting a waiver of the
attorney-client privilege or threatening to hold a corporation's refusal to
waive the attorney-client privilege against the corporation when making
a charging decision. The ACPPA does not allow a corporation to bring
suit against a U.S. Attorney for violating the law, nor does it provide for
a hearing that would allow a judge to intervene in the matter. Therefore,
a judicial remedy must be added to the ACPPA to protect the corporate
attorney-client privilege from any current or future intrusion.
IV. LIMITED JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT

The U.S. Attorneys' Manual and ACPPA are meaningless protections
of the corporate attorney-client privilege because they do not provide
any consequences for U.S. Attorneys who violate their provisions. If the
ACPPA is going to be significant, it must provide for some oversight of
the U.S. Attorneys making charging decisions. Prosecutors should have
discretion in deciding whether to prosecute a particular corporation.
Where the DOJ has maintained that a corporation's refusal to waive its
attorney-client privilege is an inappropriate ground for making a
charging decision, however, there should be some mechanism to ensure
that prosecutors are following this directive. Of course, any oversight
must respect the role of the prosecutor and the courts' long-time
reluctance to second guess prosecutorial discretion.193 At the same time,
it must provide corporations a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate
that the U.S. Attorney is improperly using the corporation's refusal to
waive the attorney-client privilege as a motivating factor in the U.S.
Attorney's charging decision.
established mechanisms").
192. Id. § 9-27.150 (explaining that the principles in the United States Attorney Manual are
internal policy and do not create any fights or benefits).
193. Historically, prosecutors have been entitled to broad discretion because the Court has said
that "the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review." Wayte v. United States, 470
U.S. 598, 607 (1985). The decision to prosecute is "ill-suited" for judicial review because courts are not
competent to examine factors such as the strength of the case, the general deterrence value, the
enforcement priorities of the government, or how the particular prosecution fits into those priorities. Id.
at 607-08. In addition, there are concerns with respect to the cost of an inquiry into prosecutorial
decision making such as a delay in the proceedings, a potential chilling effect on law enforcement, and
less effective prosecutorial enforcement because of a revelation of the enforcement goals. Id.
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It would be nearly impossible to oversee prosecutorial
decisionmaking without infringing on prosecutorial discretion. It is
particularly difficult in white collar crime because, as many scholars
have noted, prosecutorial discretion in this area is particularly broad. 194
When a corporation is involved, the prosecutor has the choice of
prosecuting the corporation, the individual wrongdoer(s), both, or
The prosecutor also has the option of pursuing the
neither. 195
corporation civilly instead of, or in addition to, criminally. Further, the
prosecutor has a plethora of criminal statutes from which to make a
charging decision because many federal criminal laws overlap and reach
the same conduct. 196 Once the prosecutor has selected a charge, he has
basically set the sentence because of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines. 197
All of these factors combine to give prosecutors
enormous power to negotiate with corporations. Indeed, it is this broad
discretion and power to negotiate that has permitted prosecutors to
coerce corporations into waiving the corporate attomey-client privilege
to demonstrate cooperation and avoid indictment. Thus, any judicial
oversight of prosecutorial decisionmaking will necessarily reduce
prosecutorial discretion in white collar crime cases.
A. The Proposal
The DOJ took the first step in reducing the discretion of its
prosecutors. The current policy, however, permits prosecutors to request
material that they know is likely privileged, without running afoul of the
Filip Guidelines. Therefore, if Congress chooses to use the ACPPA to
address this DOJ-created "culture of waiver," the ACPPA should
include a remedy that contains judicial oversight to ensure that
prosecutors do not abuse their power. Specifically, Congress should
amend the ACCPA to add a provision that permits corporations to
194. See, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr. & John Gleeson, The Federalization of Organized Crime:
Advantages of Federal Prosecution,46 HASTINGS L.J. 1095, 1125 (1995) ("With legislation covering
virtually any crime they might plausibly wish to prosecute, federal prosecutors pick their targets and

marshal their resources, not in response to the limitations of the substantive law but according to their
own priorities and agendas."); Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" is a Disgrace:
Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 654-55 (2006) (noting the

sprawling federal criminal code empowers prosecutors to pick from among a "smorgasbord" of statutes
that may apply to any given action).
195. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 5, § 9-28.200 ("In all cases involving wrongdoing by
corporate agents, prosecutors should not limit their focus solely to individuals or the corporation, but
should consider both as potential targets.").

196. O'Sullivan, supra note 194, at 665 (arguing that the federal criminal statutes overlap and are
internally inconsistent).
197. O'Sullivan, supra note 194, at 647.

2010]

A TTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

1239

request a hearing in a U.S. district court if the corporation has reason to
believe that the U.S. Attorney or other government attorney made a
charging decision or otherwise based unfavorable treatment on a
corporation's refusal to turn over attorney-client privileged information.
This hearing, which the district court could properly assign to a
would be based on the nine factors in the Filip
magistrate judge,
98
1
Guidelines.
At first blush, a hearing may seem like an unduly burdensome
intrusion on prosecutorial decisionmaking. After all, prosecutors do not
normally have to explain or justify their charging decisions. To ease the
burden, it is important to create mechanisms to protect government
attorneys from frivolous claims. First, to reduce the burden on the court
system and the U.S. Attorneys, a corporation must accompany any
request for a hearing with an affidavit signed by corporate counsel that
outlines the U.S. Attorney's explicit or implicit conduct and statements
that support the corporation's claim that the U.S. Attorney improperly
requested a waiver of the corporate attorney-client privilege or
threatened to use the corporation's refusal to waive the privilege in the
charging decision. The judge could summarily dismiss the claim at this
stage if the judge believes that the claim either has no merit or is being
used merely as a tactical device to slow down the proceedings.
Second, if the claim makes it past the affidavit stage without being
dismissed, the corporation would be required to submit a brief and
supporting documents to the court detailing not only the factual
circumstances of its claim, but also the nine Filip Guidelines factors and
how those factors counsel against charging the corporation. There
would be little to no need for discovery because the first seven factors
include information within the corporation's control or that would be
easily obtainable. Again, at this point in the proceeding, the judge could
dismiss the claim. If the judge believes there is merit to the claim, the
judge would order the government attorney to respond to the
corporation's brief. Thus, the corporation would essentially go through
two rounds of pleading before the government attorney is required to do
anything. In addition to requiring the prosecutor to respond to the
corporation's brief, the judge would order the prosecutor to temporarily
cease all proceedings against the corporation. This is necessary so that
the court's decision can have an impact on the case. If it is evident at
this point in the proceeding that the corporation's claim is frivolous, the
court would be permitted to sanction the corporate attorney and force the
corporation to pay attorneys' fees to the government for the time the
198. See supra notes 134, 152 and accompanying text.
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government spent responding to and litigating the frivolous claim of
prosecutorial misconduct. Conversely, it may be appropriate for the
court to sanction a prosecutor for particularly egregious violations of the
ACPPA even if those violations did not lead to an inappropriate
charging decision.
Third, once the proceeding has made it past the briefing stage and
survived dismissal, there would be a factual hearing with the burden on
the corporation. The corporation would have to demonstrate by clear
and convincing evidence that the prosecutor charged the corporation or
acted in an unfavorable manner toward the corporation simply because
the corporation refused to waive the attorney-client privilege. The high
standard of proof would be necessary to respect the prosecutor's ability
to make choices in close cases. Thus, if after reviewing the factors, the
court believes that the prosecutor could have gone either way in the
charging decision, the judge must defer to the prosecutor's decision. On
the other hand, if the corporation has proven by clear and convincing
evidence that the prosecutor based the charging decision on the
corporation's refusal to turn over privileged documents, the judge must
provide relief to the corporation for the violation.
Once the judge determines that the prosecutor acted improperly, the
need to protect the prosecutor's discretion must give way to the need to
protect the corporation's right to the attorney-client privilege. The
remedy for violating the ACPPA should take account of both the need to
deter prosecutors and to cure the prosecutor's violation. But ultimately
the judge will need a range of options to fashion an appropriate remedy
in each case. One could argue that in an extreme case where the
prosecutor violated the ACPPA by demanding privileged materials and
threatening an indictment even though the facts of the situation did not
support an indictment under the Filip Guidelines, the only remedy that
would cure the prosecutor's violation would be to enjoin the prosecutor
from seeking an indictment. After all, the harm to the corporation (i.e.,
drop in stock price, credit lines drying up, loss of consumer confidence
and market share, loss of jobs, class actions, etc.) stems from the
indictment. But enjoining a prosecution is an extraordinary remedy only
granted in limited situations. t99 Further, there may be separation-of-

199. Federal courts have been permitted to enjoin an indictment to avoid a chilling effect on
constitutional rights. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670-71 (2004) (upholding preliminary
injunction against criminal enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act because individuals may
"self-censor" rather than risk a trial); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1965)
(acknowledging that the threat of a criminal indictment may chill First Amendment rights); Truax v.
Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 38-39 (1915) (recognizing that the threat of an indictment could lead to an
unconstitutional denial of the right to earn a living and to continue employment).
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20 0
power concerns in enjoining a prosecutor from seeking an indictment.
Even if the separation-of-powers concerns could be alleviated by
creating a statutory entitlement to an injunction,20 ' judges may be
reluctant to grant an injunction because it would be a permanent bar to
an indictment. Thus, if an injunction was an available remedy, it would
need to be temporary so that the prosecutor would be permitted to return
to the judge and argue that there is new independent evidence that
supports an indictment.
In less extreme cases, where the violation is implied by the fact that
the prosecutor is seeking an indictment despite the fact that a low-level
rogue employee took the criminal actions, the company took immediate
action to fire the employee when they learned of the conduct, the
company had no prior criminal conduct, the company had an extensive
compliance program, and the company cooperated by quickly turning
over all nonprivileged documents and making employees available for
government interviews, a lesser remedy would be appropriate. In such a
situation, where the prosecutor cannot offer a plausible explanation that
does not involve the corporation's refusal to waive the privilege, the
judge should have the option of removing the prosecutor from the case.
Removing the prosecutor will restore the corporation's right to the
privilege because the corporation will have a fair opportunity to argue its
case to a new prosecutor who does not have a tumultuous history with
the corporation. Although the cost of the remedy would be high due to
the loss of time and resources, it would only delay rather than prohibit
an indictment. In other situations, the appropriate remedy may be
sanctions against the prosecutor.

B. The Costs and Benefits of the Proposal
This proposal would be beneficial because it would restore the
attorney-client privilege to the status it held before the DOJ's waiver
policy. The DOJ's waiver policy has made the privilege uncertain.
Corporate counsel could not predict when a prosecutor would require
waiver to demonstrate cooperation. Nor could counsel guarantee its
client or the client's employees that their conversations would remain
confidential. As the Supreme Court explained in Upjohn, "[a]n

200. See Stolt-Nielsen, S.A. v. United States, 442 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that in normal
circumstances separation of powers would prevent a federal court from enjoining the Executive Branch
from filing an indictment).
201. A full discussion of whether there is a separation of powers problem with a federal court
enjoining a prosecutor from seeking an indictment and whether that concern could be alleviated by
creating a statutory remedy is beyond the scope of this Article.
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uncertain privilege.., is little better than no privilege at all., 21 2 This
proposal restores that certainty because it permits judges to review the
DOJ's practices to ensure that the prosecutor does not put efficiency and
convenience ahead of the attorney-client privilege. If judges hold
prosecutors accountable for improperly requesting waiver, lawyers and
clients will have more faith in the confidentiality of their
communications.
In addition, the proposal will deter prosecutors from threatening
corporations with indictment if the corporation refuses to disclose its
internal investigation report to the prosecutor. Prosecutors will know
that they will be held responsible for any actions they take in the
investigation that are contrary to the statute's directives. The threat of
the remedy combined with the likelihood of being reported by opposing
counsel will convince prosecutors to follow the statute. Prosecutors will
not want to face the prospect of being embarrassed or subjected to
sanctions for violating the statute. Thus, they will come up with
alternative means to collect the information they need to enforce the law
that do not involve waiver of the corporate attomey--client privilege.
In turn, corporate lawyers will not be put in dubious ethical situations
with corporate employees where the interests of the corporation and its
employees are adverse.20 3 Instead, corporate counsel will be able to
gather information to advise the corporation on the appropriate response
to potential criminal charges. Employees will feel confident sharing
information openly and freely with counsel. Counsel will not be forced
to alter their internal investigations to account for the fact that the
corporation may disclose the results to the prosecutor. As a result,
counsel will be in a better position to provide good advice to the
corporation. Thus, the proposal restores the benefits of the corporate
attorney-client privilege as they existed before the DOJ adopted the
waiver policy.
The proposal, however, is not without costs. The strongest objection
to the proposal would be the potentially sizeable burden it would place
on the judiciary and prosecutors. Specifically, critics may argue that the
negative impact of administering waiver hearings would significantly
outweigh the advantages of the approach. The hearing would require
courts to examine ambiguous situations where prosecutors requested
information that turned out to be contained in documents that were
protected by the corporate attorney-client privilege. The court would
202. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
203. Counsel may still face situations where an employee(s) is the clear wrongdoers and it is in
the best interest of the corporation to distance themselves from that employee(s) or turn him over to the
government. But, the us (employees) versus them (corporation) mentality will be greatly diminished.
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have to examine the facts of those situations and determine whether the
prosecutor acted inappropriately by knowingly requesting privileged
documents. The distinction between appropriate and inappropriate
requests is unclear because factual documents may contain attorneyclient privileged communications. Further, the court would have to
decide whether the prosecutor acted inappropriately after learning the
requested information was privileged. Specifically, the question would
be whether the prosecutor either threatened to base or actually did base
her charging decision on the corporation's refusal to disclose privileged
communications. The additional evidence necessary to resolve these
questions may require prosecutors to create lengthy records
documenting their dealings with corporate counsel, including any
requests for cooperation and the corporation's response. It may also
require prosecutors to document their decisionmaking process for
charging corporations, especially if the charging decision hinges on the
prosecutor's judgment that the corporation was uncooperative. Even
with this additional evidence, the court's decision would largely be
based on inferences and credibility determinations. Also problematic is
the possibility that corporate defendants may attempt to use the waiver
hearing to derail the prosecution, such that the additional litigation over
waiver drains judicial resources and lessens efficiency.
While these concerns are legitimate, there is also good reason to
believe that the waiver hearing would not cause severe administrative
problems and that some of the burdens on the prosecutor could actually
benefit the administration of justice. First, using a process where the
judge has discretion to dismiss frivolous claims at various stages in the
litigation will take care of some cases by itself. Second, judges are
experienced at making credibility determinations and at determining the
applicability of the attorney-client privilege. Although the inquiry will
not be easy, there is no reason to believe that it is beyond the
competency of district or magistrate judges.
Third, this hearing may actually lead to prosecutors keeping more
records documenting their charging decisions. While that will create a
burden for prosecutors, it could lead to more fairness and consistency in
prosecutorial decisionmaking. It could also lead to more collaboration
between prosecutors and corporations. If prosecutors document their
requests for cooperation, along with the corporation's responses, and
then put their reasoning for finding a corporation cooperative or
uncooperative in writing, it could give the corporation an opportunity to
work with prosecutors to remedy any deficiencies in its cooperation.
Corporate counsel would be in a position to have a frank conversation
with the prosecutors about any remaining information that the
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prosecutors are seeking and whether that information is protected by the
privilege. If the prosecutors are seeking information that is privileged,
the corporation can attempt to find some way to satisfy the
government's needs without waiving the privilege. Conversely, if the
corporation refuses an appropriate request for cooperation, the
prosecutors would have a paper trail to defend themselves against any
claim that they acted improperly.
Professor Michael Seigel argues the balance of power between
prosecutors and corporations will shift to corporations if a provision
banning prosecutors from requesting waiver of the privilege is written
into law. 204 He believes corporations will have an unfair advantage
because they could do little to cooperate and then move for dismissal of
the charges if the prosecutor indicts the corporation.20 5 This is certainly
possible, but the risk of such behavior is lessened by the threat of
sanctions, the potential payment of attorneys' fees to the government,
and the clear and convincing evidence burden on the corporation. All of
these measures would likely deter many attorneys from bringing an
unfounded claim. In addition, the remedy is meant to account for the
dramatic imbalance of power between prosecutors and corporations. It
is precisely that imbalance that enabled prosecutors to coerce corporate
defendants to waive their attorney-client privilege to stave off
prosecution.
This proposal could protect the corporate attorney--client privilege. It
could restore the lines of communications and the trust between
employer and employee. It could also enable corporations to receive
better advice from their attorneys.
Importantly, it would deter
prosecutors from forcing corporations to waive their attorney-client
privilege to demonstrate cooperation and avoid indictment. The costs to
the judiciary, while real, are not substantial enough to outweigh the
benefits of the proposal. It is the judiciary's duty to make privilege
204. Michael L. Seigel, CorporateAmerica Fights Back: The Battle Over Waiver of the Attorney-

Client Privilege, 49 B.C. L. REV. 1 (2008). Seigel argues:
If a prohibition against asking for or using waiver were written into law, the balance of
power between prosecutors and corporations would undergo a fundamental shift. Far
more corporations would choose to exercise their privilege even if it meant that they
could provide only minimal assistance to a criminal investigation as a result. If a
prosecutor decided to bring charges against a corporation under such circumstances, the
corporation could move for dismissal of the indictment based upon the statute, claiming
that it was being penalized for failing to waive privilege. This would be a powerful
argument. If the court refused to dismiss the charges, the same issue would arise at
sentencing. The corporation would want (and presumably would be entitled to receive)
the full benefit of cooperation, even if that cooperation were of little use.
Id. at 52 (footnote omitted).
205. Id.
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determinations. Thus, only the judiciary can properly safeguard the
sanctity of our legal system's oldest privilege.
C. JudicialOversight Versus the Alternatives
One alternative to the procedure proposed here is to permit the DOJ to

police its own prosecutors as alluded to in the Filip Guidelines. °6 The
Filip Guidelines explain that corporate counsel should raise their
concerns regarding a prosecutor's compliance with the Filip Guidelines
with the prosecutor's supervisor and that "such allegations are subject to
established
mechanisms. 20 7
through
potential investigation
Presumably, the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) 2°8 has
jurisdiction to handle these allegations of misconduct.20 9 OPR receives

complaints of attorney misconduct from many sources, including private
attorneys. OPR reviews each allegation of misconduct upon receipt and
"determines whether further investigation is warranted.''02 1 OPR has

discretion as to whether to conduct an inquiry or full investigation in a
particular case.211 If OPR conducts an investigation, it typically
interviews the DOJ attorney late in the investigation, after all of the

allegations are fully developed. OPR then makes findings of fact and
reaches a conclusion as to whether the DOJ attorney committed
professional misconduct.212 If OPR finds that the DOJ attorney
committed professional misconduct, it provides a report to the Deputy
Attorney General outlining its findings, conclusions, and
recommendation for disciplinary action. 213 The attorney's supervisor
206. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANUAL, supra note 5, § 9-28.760.
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. OPR was established in 1975 in response to the misconduct by DOJ officials during the
Watergate scandal. See Office of Professional Responsibility, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Policies and
at
and
Procedures],
available
OPR
Policies
I
I,
[hereinafter
Procedures
http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/polandproc.htm.
209. Id. 2 (explaining that "OPR has jurisdiction to investigate allegations of misconduct
involving Department attorneys that relate to the exercise of their authority to investigate, litigate or
provide legal advice").
210. ld. 4.
211. See id. (explaining that the determination whether to conduct an investigation is a matter of
"investigative judgment," turning on "the nature of the allegation, its apparent credibility, its specificity,
its susceptibility to verification, and the source of the allegation").
212. OPR may find professional misconduct in two types of cases: "(1) where an attorney
intentionally violated ... Department regulation or policy [such as the USAM], or (2) where an attorney
acted in reckless disregard of his or her obligation to comply with that obligation or standard." Id. 9.
OPR may also find that the attorney used poor judgment or made a mistake, but this type of finding does
not constitute professional misconduct. See id.
213. Id. The range of potential discipline for a DOJ attorney includes written reprimand,
suspension, demotion, or removal. Id. 10
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makes the ultimate decision whether to impose discipline.214 Thus,
OPR's influence on the outcome of these cases is limited.
The DOJ OPR receives about a thousand complaints a year, but has
not made reports on its activities public from the years 2005 to 2009.215
Some judges have described OPR as a "vacuum" or "black hole" where
complaints of prosecutorial abuse go to die.2 16 If OPR is the sole
avenue for exploring prosecutorial misconduct in this context, there is a
great risk that there will be little public confidence in the outcome of
these investigations given OPR's recent history.2 17 Although Attorney
General Holder appears committed to reforming OPR,2 18 there is likely a
backlog of complaints as well as several high profile cases that will
219
command OPR's attention.
Even assuming that the OPR has the time and resources to handle
complaints alleging that prosecutors have violated the Filip Guidelines,
there are still procedural problems with the OPR review process. First, a
supervisor who receives a report from a corporation that an Assistant
U.S. Attorney has acted improperly has the discretion to decide whether
to report that misconduct to the OPR. 220 As the supervisor is not
required to convey the allegation of misconduct, the supervisor may turn
a blind eye to the actions of the prosecutor. Second, OPR retains
"investigative judgment" and may decide not to examine the allegations
of wrongdoing.2 2 1 Quite simply, there is no accountability for OPR's
acts or omissions. Third, even if OPR finds a transgression, OPR has no

214. Id.
215. Joe Palazzolo, Holder PromisesJudges a New Day at DOJ,NAT'L L.J., May 4, 2009, NAT'L
L.J., at 4.
216. See United States v. Stevens, No. 08-CR-231 (EGS), 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39046 (D.D.C.
Apr. 7, 2009) (setting aside a verdict against Sen. Ted Stevens following a hearing at which the
government conceded that it failed to turn over exculpatory information to the defense in spite of the
court's "repeated admonishments" and appointing a special prosecutor in the case); see also Neil A.
Lewis, Tables Turned on Prosecutionin Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at AI (reporting Judge
Emmet G. Sullivan took the "highly unusual" step of appointing a private attorney, Henry Schuelke, to
investigate the six prosecutors to determine whether they had committed criminal contempt).
217. Historically, critics have regarded OPR as inept at policing prosecutors. See John Gibeaut,
at
July
2009,
available
ABA
JOURNAL,
'Roach
Motel,'
The
http://www.abajoumal.com/magazine/the-roach-motel/ (quoting Professor Bruce Green calling the
OPR "the Roach Motel of the Justice Department" because "[c]ases check in, but they don't check
out.").
218. Attorney General Eric H. Holder Jr. appointed Mary Patrice Brown, a senior prosecutor and
chief of the criminal division in the United States Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, to lead
OPR. David Johnston, Directorof Ethics Is Replaced at Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009,
at A20.
219. See, e.g., supra note 216.
220. U.S. ATTORNEYS' MANuAL, supra note 5, § 1-4.100.
221. See OPR Policies and Procedures, supra note 208, 4.
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power to enforce its decisions.222 It can only recommend a disciplinary
action.223 It cannot require that the prosecutor's supervisor impose that
discipline. Ordinarily, OPR does not make its findings public.
Therefore, there is no way to put outside pressure on the prosecutor's
supervisor to impose the recommended discipline. Fourth, even if the
supervisor decides to reprimand, suspend, demote, or remove the
prosecutor, the harm to the corporation may already be done. The act of
filing a complaint with a supervisor that eventually makes its way to the
OPR does not halt the proceedings. Thus, by the time the OPR process
is complete and the supervisor disciplines the prosecutor, the corporation
could have already been indicted, facing the loss of consumer
confidence, and a decrease in its stock price. It could also be facing civil
litigation.
The advantage of OPR over this Article's proposal is that there would
be no cost to the judiciary. If there is no court proceeding, then the time
and resources of the judicial department will not be used. As the OPR is
a government office, however, government resources will still be
utilized. Some of the costs to using the OPR are similar to the proposal
in this Article. Assuming that OPR fully investigates the complaints in a
timely manner, the infringement on the prosecutor's discretion in the
OPR context would be indistinguishable from the infringement in the
judicial context. OPR would be second guessing the prosecutor in the
same way that a court would be second guessing the prosecutor. Any
chilling effect on the prosecutor due to the oversight would be nearly
identical.
Unlike the proposal in this Article, using the OPR to adjudicate
claims of prosecutorial misconduct may reduce confidence in our system
of justice. Because of the OPR's poor reputation, it lacks the credibility
needed to effectively deter and punish prosecutors for violating the Filip
Guidelines.224 As Professor Angela Davis noted, "[t]here is a great risk
of actual and perceived bias in the decision-making process since the
Justice Department has a vested interest in demonstrating that its
prosecutors do not engage in misconduct., 225 Judges, on the other hand,
would not need to validate prosecutors' actions. Instead, judges would
review prosecutors' actions impartially and make a fair and just decision
222. See id. 1 10 (explaining that upon a finding of professional misconduct OPR is only
empowered to issue a report and recommend sanction to the attorney's superior).
223. See id.
224. Angela J.Davis, The Legal Profession's Failure to Discipline Unethical Prosecutors, 36
HOFSTRA L. REV.275, 295 (2007).

225. Id. (explaining that the fact that OPR dismisses the majority of complaints as frivolous,
outside OPR's jurisdiction, or vague and unsupported by the evidence does not prove bias, but the
perception of bias is present).
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regarding their conduct and any needed discipline. Prosecutors are more
likely to be deterred from improper conduct if they know that a judge
will be reviewing how they handled the charging decision. As there is
little public confidence in OPR's process for reviewing and disciplining
prosecutors, OPR is not a viable alternative for reviewing complaints
that prosecutors are abusing the legal system's most sacred privilege.
Another alternative would be to permit corporations to raise their
claims as part of a motion to dismiss the charges. The benefit to this
alternative is that it would save judicial resources because the
overwhelming majority of these cases settle and would never reach the
court. But the supposed benefit is the cost in this situation; prosecutors
have not been held accountable for eviscerating the corporate attorneyclient privilege because their conduct occurs preindictment. This
alternative would permit most prosecutors' charging decisions to
continue to escape judicial scrutiny except in the few cases where there
is actually a trial rather than a preindictment settlement. Further, the
harm to both the corporation and the attorney-client privilege has
already occurred if the prosecutor has used the corporation's refusal to
waive the privilege as a reason for charging the corporation. The
corporation will already be suffering from the collateral consequences of
indictment. Thus, this alternative would not serve the interests of
corporations that have already been harmed by the DOJ's charging
policy.
The alternatives to the proposal in this Article are both appealing in
their own right, but they do not fully repair the damage that the DOJ has
done to the corporate attorney-client privilege. Neither alternative
addresses prosecutors' preindictment conduct that lead to the uproar in
the legal community. Nor do the alternatives restore the certainty of the
privilege or reduce corporate counsel's ethical dilemmas. It is only
through judicial oversight that these concerns can be addressed. Thus,
judicial oversight is necessary so that corporations may finally regain the
protection of the corporate attorney-client privilege in criminal
investigations.
V. CONCLUSION

Under the guise of seeking cooperation in criminal investigations, the
DOJ permitted its prosecutors to condition leniency on a corporation's
willingness to disclose communications protected by the attorney-client
privilege. This practice enabled prosecutors to obtain more convictions
of corporations, their employees, and agents because prosecutors had
access to the results of corporations' attorney-conducted internal
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investigations. Thus, corporate attorneys had to balance zealously
representing their clients and accurately reporting their findings to the
government. The end result was that the corporate attorney-client
privilege was weakened in criminal investigations.
Opponents of the DOJ's policy were unsuccessful at convincing the
DOJ to amend the policy. It was only after Congress got involved that
the DOJ adjusted its policy. The initial adjustments to the policy,
however, were mere window dressing. Prosecutors were still free to
hold a corporation's refusal to turn over attorney-client privileged
communications against the corporation when making a charging
decision. As the threat of legislation loomed over the DOJ, the DOJ
made more significant changes to the policy. Under the current policy,
prosecutors are no longer authorized to demand that corporations waive
the attorney-client privilege. But, prosecutors can request information
that is most likely privileged and use the corporation's refusal to provide
the information against the corporation so long as they characterize their
request as seeking factual information. After several bites at the apple, it
is evident that the DOJ will not voluntarily rein in prosecutorial
discretion.
The proposed legislation in Congress is an important step in restoring
the protections of the corporate attorney-client privilege. But, the
legislation falls short because it does not provide a remedy for aggrieved
Congress cannot leave it to prosecutors to police
corporations.
themselves. Nor can Congress be satisfied with being the catalyst for
incremental change at the DOJ. If Congress is serious about reforming
the DOJ's practices, its legislation must include judicial oversight. Any
alternative that does not include judicial oversight would fail to curb
prosecutorial abuse of the corporate attorney-client privilege. The time
has come for Congress to pass legislation that preserves the corporate
attorney-client privilege.

